Losses versus Violation: The Unity and Limits of Privacy by Skopek, Jeffrey
LOSSES VERSUS VIOLATIONS:  
THE UNITY AND LIMITS OF PRIVACY 
 
 
(manuscript under review) 
 
 
Jeffrey M. Skopek 
 
 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................... 1 
I. DIFFERENTIATING PRIVACY ........................................................................ 5 
A. Normative Theories ............................................................................... 5 
B. Descriptive Theories .............................................................................. 9 
II. CONFLATION ERRORS .............................................................................. 11 
A. Mistargeted Critique ............................................................................ 11 
B. Misguided Skepticism ......................................................................... 14 
III. PRIVACY LOSSES ..................................................................................... 18 
A. Access .................................................................................................. 19 
B. Epistemic Merit ................................................................................... 27 
C. Truth .................................................................................................... 33 
IV. PRIVACY VIOLATIONS ............................................................................ 36 
A. The Path-Based Element ..................................................................... 37 
B. Rethinking Aggregation and Use ........................................................ 40 
C. The Status of Inferences ...................................................................... 49 
CONCLUSION ................................................................................................. 56 
        LOSSES VERSUS VIOLATIONS 
  
1 
INTRODUCTION 
It is widely thought that the core problems posed by new technologies 
of personal data mining and analysis, as well as their solutions, can be 
explained in terms of privacy.  Take, for example, the uses of personal data 
in these cases:  
• an employer rejects a job applicant on the basis of a health trait 
inferred from non-health data in his application;  
• a landlord screens out applicants on the basis of a proxy for religion;  
• the police aggregate data about a person’s public movements, thereby 
discovering the person’s sexual and political orientations; 
• an internet platform infers private facts about a person from his 
browsing history and uses this to tailor content; 
• a government agency makes a decision about an individual entitlement 
on the basis of an algorithmic assessment that it cannot explain.   
These and other related uses of personal data are widely seen as violating 
privacy rights.1  But this is a mistaken diagnosis, arising from the failure to 
differentiate between privacy losses and privacy violations.  In these cases, 
there may be losses, but not violations.  To understand and address the actual 
threats posed by new ways of accessing and using personal data, it is 
necessary to step back and clarify what privacy is and what it is not.   
For as long as privacy has been the subject of academic study, privacy 
scholars have highlighted that it is an ill-defined concept,2 and for as long as 
they have tried to clarify it, their definitions have been rejected by others as 
being too broad, too narrow, or both.3  In light of this history, Dan Solove has 
championed the growing view that we should abandon our attempt “to locate 
the ‘essential’ or ‘core’ characteristics of privacy,” which he identifies as the 
cause of the deep disagreements in the literature.4  The way forward, he 
                                               
1 See, e.g., Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PENN. L. REV. 477, 505–15, 
518–21 (2006); Kate Crawford & Jason Schultz, Big Data and Due Process: Toward a 
Framework to Redress Predictive Privacy Harms, 55 B.C. L. REV. 93, 96–106 (2014). 
2  See, e.g., DANIEL J. SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY 1 (2008) (“Privacy… is a 
concept in disarray. Nobody can articulate what it means.”); Tom Gerety, Redefining Privacy, 
12 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 233, 233 (1977) (“Privacy is a legal wall badly in need of 
mending.”); Jeffery L. Johnson, Privacy and the Judgment of Others, 23 J. VALUE INQUIRY 
157, 157 (1989) (comparing the concept of privacy to “a haystack in a hurricane”);  
3 In 1978, David O’Brien concluded that the unitary definitions of privacy that had been 
developed by others were either “imprecise, or too broad, or too narrow.” David M. O’Brien, 
Privacy and the Right of Access: Purposes and Paradoxes of Information Control, 30 ADMIN. 
L. REV. 45, 62 (1978).  Nearly 25 years later, Dan Solove reached the same conclusion: “The 
most prevalent problem with the conceptions is that they are either too narrow or too broad…. 
Often, the same conceptions can suffer from being both too narrow and too broad.”  Daniel J. 
Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1087, 1092 (2002). 
4  SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY, supra note 2, at 8.  See also JUDITH WAGNER 
DECEW, IN PURSUIT OF PRIVACY: LAW, ETHICS, AND THE RISE OF TECHNOLOGY 61 (1997) 
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argues, is to understand privacy as a Wittgensteinian “family resemblance” 
concept that is not unified by any essential features, but rather held together 
by a common pool of similar features.  While Solove’s analysis is 
illuminating, it has hidden costs, which are avoided by an alternative 
diagnosis of the current state of affairs. 
This will article will demonstrate that the two trends in the privacy 
literature identified thus far—the reliance on privacy to articulate an ever-
growing list of concerns about data-driven technologies, and the growing 
skepticism about whether privacy has a unifying core—are both misguided 
for the same reason.  They both arise from the failure to differentiate between 
descriptive and normative theories of privacy and the different questions that 
they seek to answer (explored in Part I).  As used in ordinary language, the 
term privacy may refer either to a right or to a value-neutral state of affairs.  
In having these two dimensions, privacy is similar to many other important 
moral and legal concepts, such as liberty and discrimination, where the two 
dimensions are generally recognized. 5   With privacy, however, the 
distinction, which was once widely recognized as significant, is now generally 
overlooked.6  As a result, two different questions have become conflated: the 
first is the descriptive question of whether a person has suffered a privacy 
loss, and the second is the value-laden question of whether a person has 
suffered a privacy violation. 
The conflation of these questions is problematic for several reasons, 
including that it has generated significant misconceptions in the privacy 
literature (demonstrated in Part II).  First, it has generated mistargeted 
                                               
(arguing that “it is not possible to give a unique, unitary definition of privacy that covers all 
the diverse privacy interests” and that we should understand “privacy as a broad an 
multifaceted cluster concept”); David E. Pozen, Privacy-Privacy Tradeoffs, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 
221, 225–28 (2016) (discussing the “pluralistic turn” in privacy scholarship); Scott A. 
Anderson, Privacy Without the Right to Privacy, 91 THE MONIST 81, 82 (2008)  (identifying 
reasons to be skeptical about a unified account of privacy and arguing instead for a “piecemeal 
approach to privacy”). 
5 For example, as Dworkin explains: “We use ‘liberty’ in its flat sense simply to indicate 
the absence of constraint…We use ‘liberty’ in its normative sense, on the other hand, to 
describe the ways in which we believe people ought to be free.”  RONALD DWORKIN, 
SOVEREIGN VIRTUE: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF EQUALITY 125 (2002).  See also Ralf M. 
Bader, Moralised Conceptions of Liberty, THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF FREEDOM 59, 59–60 
(David Schmidtz & Carmen Pavel, 2018) (identifying and discussing the difference between 
descriptive and normative conceptions of liberty). 
6 For example, the distinction was highlighted by: Ferdinand D. Schoeman, Privacy: 
Philosophical Dimensions of the Literature, PHILOSOPHICAL DIMENSIONS OF PRIVACY: AN 
ANTHOLOGY 1, 3 (Ferdinand D. Schoeman, 1984), William A. Parent, Privacy, Morality, and 
the Law, PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 269, 309 (1983), Hyman Gross, The Concept of Privacy, 42 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 34, 35–36 (1967); O’Brien, supra note 3, at 75.  It is now often overlooked, or if 
acknowledged, dismissed as unimportant.  See, e.g., Adam Moore, Defining Privacy, 39 J. SOC. 
PHIL. 411, 421 (2008).  But there are exceptions, such as Madison Powers, A Cognitive Access 
Definition of Privacy, 15 LAW & PHIL. 369 (1996).   
        LOSSES VERSUS VIOLATIONS 
  
3 
critiques in which descriptive theories are rejected for failing to answer 
normative questions.  This type of analytical error, known as a “category 
error,” has led many to believe that there is greater disagreement in the 
literature than is actually the case.  Second, the conflation of privacy losses 
and privacy violations has generated misguided skepticism about the 
possibility of developing a unified theory of privacy.  This skepticism 
assumes that a unified theory of privacy must be grounded in normative 
coherence (i.e., in an agreement about what constitutes a privacy violation).  
An alternative approach, which has been overlooked, is to ground it in 
descriptive coherence (i.e., in an agreement about what constitutes a privacy 
loss).   
On the question of what constitutes a privacy loss, there is also 
disagreement in the literature, but common ground is easier to find.  Critical 
reflection on how the concept is used in ordinary language reveals three 
criteria that together define it (developed in Part III).  First, a person or 
information about a person must have been accessed by someone else.  Mere 
accessibility, lack of control over access, and access by non-persons might 
seem to constitute privacy losses—as others have argued—but closer analysis 
reveals that these criteria track related but distinct matters.  Second, the means 
of access must have some epistemic merit.  While knowledge is not required 
to cause a privacy loss, a lucky guess is insufficient.  Third, the object of the 
access must be a person or fact about a person.  Access to false information 
alone cannot cause a privacy loss. 
Building on this understanding of the nature of privacy losses, it is 
possible to identify the common core of privacy rights: they restrict the means 
by which privacy losses can permissibly occur.  On this account (developed 
in Part IV), a person suffers a privacy violation when a restriction on the 
permissible means of generating such access is breached.  Thus, a key 
difference between privacy losses and violations is that losses are outcome-
based, whereas violations are path-based.  Privacy rights do not protect a 
reasonable expectation that privacy will be maintained, but rather a 
reasonable expectation that privacy will not be lost in certain ways. 
For the avoidance of confusion, it is worth highlighting that although 
this theory defines privacy violations in terms of privacy losses (which 
provides for the coherence of privacy), it does not suggest that a privacy loss 
is a necessary element of a privacy violation.  On the contrary, in line with 
common intuitions, it explains how a privacy violation can occur without the 
occurrence of a privacy loss.7   
                                               
7 For example, it suggests that the police could violate your privacy rights by installing an 
unauthorized wiretap your phone (breaching a restriction on means of access), even if you do 
not end up speaking on the phone (so access is not obtained).  Cf. Schoeman, supra note 6, at 
4 (“We can also envision situations in which we would want to say that a person has not in fact 
suffered a loss of privacy but has suffered a violation of his right to privacy.”).   
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Note also that this theory does not take a position on the question of 
which means of access are impermissible, but rather provides a foundation 
for a wide range of positions on this and other related questions (such as why 
privacy is valuable and what types of facts should be protected).  Because it 
unifies privacy along its descriptive rather than its normative dimension, it is 
compatible with disagreement on these questions.  For example, it is 
compatible with Helen Nissenbaum’s argument that privacy rights should be 
understood as rights to “contextual integrity,”8 as well as Lior Strahilevitz’s 
argument that privacy rights should be focused on protecting interests against 
intrusion and disclosure.9   
At the same time, the theory has a critical edge, 10  challenging 
widespread claims about whether and how privacy rights are violated by data 
aggregation, the unconsented use of personal data, and the inference of private 
facts from disclosed data.  Paying attention to the loss/violation distinction 
reveals that the scholarship on these issues has misinterpreted key Supreme 
Court cases, including the landmark technology cases of Carpenter v. United 
States 11  and Kyllo v. United States. 12   In addition, it helps clarify the 
normative reasons why privacy rights should not be expanded in the ways that 
have been suggested.   
To be clear, in challenging widespread claims about how aggregation, 
unconsented use, and inferential analysis violate privacy rights, this article is 
not arguing that restrictions on these practices are unjustified.   Rather, the 
argument is that the justification must often be found outside privacy rights.  
The mere fact that a harm arises from the mining or use of personal data does 
not make it a privacy harm.13   
It is likely that analytical precision will reveal that some complaints 
that have been characterized as privacy violations should not be legally 
actionable at all.  In other cases, it will allow us to develop causes of action 
that are justified by the actual interests at stake.  For example, privacy is often 
conflated with autonomy, fairness, and due process—all of which are distinct 
interests that may independently deserve protection.  But here too, greater 
precision will reveal previously unrecognized limits: when the actual interests 
                                               
8 HELEN NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT: TECHNOLOGY, POLICY, AND THE INTEGRITY 
OF SOCIAL LIFE 9, 127 (2009).  
9 Lior Strahilevitz, Reunifying Privacy Law, 98 CAL. L. REV. 2007 (2010). 
10 Cf. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 116–18 (1978) (explaining that the 
theory that best fits and justifies an area of law will often not fit all of our judgements about it; 
rather, to achieve coherence, it will often find some judgements to be mistaken or 
misconceived). 
11 Carpenter v. United States, 139 S.Ct. 2206 (2018). 
12 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001). 
13 Privacy harms are one type of information-based harm, not vice versa.  For this reason, 
data protection law is not the EU’s version of privacy law, as is often suggested.  Because data 
protection law is far more expansive, it remains outside the scope of this article, and it may not 
fit within any single unifying theory—though that is question that must be set aside.   
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at stake are identified, it will become clear that they do not always justify 
restrictions that are as expansive as those imposed by privacy rights.  For all 
who are concerned about the ever-expanding uses of our personal data, this 
may appear to be a cost of my theory.  But if so, it should be accepted as the 
cost of coherence.  Recognizing the difference between losses and violations 
reveals the unity and limits of privacy.  
To summarize and provide a roadmap of this analysis, there are four 
core steps:  Part I provides a taxonomic analysis of the privacy literature that 
differentiates between normative and descriptive theories of privacy, the 
different questions that they address, and the answers that have been offered.  
Part II demonstrates that the conflation of normative and descriptive questions 
has generated mistargeted critique and misguided skepticism, identifying 
descriptive coherence as a potential foundation for a unifying theory of 
privacy.  Part III develops and defends the claim that privacy losses are 
defined by three core criteria: access, epistemic merit, and truth.  Part IV 
argues that a privacy violation occurs when a restriction on the permissible 
means of access is breached, challenging widespread claims about how 
privacy rights are violated by the aggregation, unconsented use, and 
inferential analysis of personal data. 
I.  DIFFERENTIATING PRIVACY 
A review of the vast body of privacy scholarship might lead one to 
conclude that it contains intractable conflict about the nature of privacy,14 but 
there is actually less disagreement than it seems.  Much of the apparent 
conflict arises from a failure to differentiate between normative and 
descriptive theories of privacy, the variations within them, and the different 
questions to which they provide answers.  A taxonomic analysis of these 
differences (in this Part) helps reveal the errors caused by their conflation (in 
the next Part).  While some of the individual themes identified in this survey 
of the literature have been noted by others, many of the most important 
distinctions have not. 15  
A.  Normative Theories 
Most of the privacy literature is devoted to the development of 
normative theories of privacy (as a matter of law or morality) that provide an 
account of one or more of the following: the nature of privacy interests, the 
rights that arise from these interests, and the scope of these rights.   
                                               
14 See supra notes 2-3 and infra Part II.A.   
15 Cf. Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, supra note 3, at 1099–1124 (identifying some of 
the themes, but without the same analytical framework). 
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1.  Interests in privacy 
A significant body of privacy scholarship has defined privacy in 
terms of the interests that it protects.  Three sets of interconnected interests—
individual, relational, and societal—have received significant attention.16   
The interests of the individual in being an autonomous person are at 
the core of many definitions of privacy.  For example, privacy has been 
defined as protecting “inviolate personality” (Samuel Warren and Louis 
Brandeis),17 “the individual’s interest in becoming, being, and remaining a 
person” (Jeffrey Reiman), 18  “the individual’s independence, dignity and 
integrity” (Edward Bloustein),19 and other similar values.20  
It is widely agreed, however, that privacy does not just protect the 
individual in isolation, but also the personal relationships that are essential to 
human flourishing.  Often, these interests are identified in terms of intimacy.21  
For example, Tom Gerety defines privacy as “control over the intimacies of 
personal identity”22 and Julie Inness identifies intimacy as the defining feature 
unifying the set of intrusions that are properly called privacy invasions.23  But 
others characterize the relational interests more broadly.  For example, 
Charles Fried defines privacy as protecting relationships of “respect, love, 
friendship and trust.”24  
Finally, extending beyond personal relational interests, there are the 
interests of the individual in participating in social and political life.  For 
example, Julie Cohen suggests that privacy fosters a capacity for autonomy 
that “is an indispensable condition for reasoned participation in the 
                                               
16 See generally NISSENBAUM, supra note 8, at 67–89 (identifying these three categories). 
17 Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 
205 (1890). 
18 Jeffrey H. Reiman, Privacy, Intimacy, and Personhood, 6 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 26, 43–44 
(1976). 
19 Edward J. Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean 
Prosser, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 971 (1964). 
20 See, e.g., Parent, supra note 6, at 278 (defining privacy in terms of “freedom and 
individuality”); Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, HARV. L. REV. 737, 751 (1989) (“the 
fundamental freedom not to have one’s life too totally determined by a progressively more 
normalizing state”); Joseph Kupfer, Privacy, Autonomy, and Self-Concept, 24 AM. PHIL. Q. 81, 
81 (1987) (“the development of an autonomous self”). 
21 See Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, supra note 3, at 1121 (providing an overview). 
22 Gerety, supra note 2, at 236. 
23 JULIE C. INNESS, PRIVACY, INTIMACY, AND ISOLATION 56 (1992).  See also JEFFREY 
ROSEN, THE UNWANTED GAZE: THE DESTRUCTION OF PRIVACY IN AMERICA 8 (2011); Robert S. 
Gerstein, Intimacy and Privacy, 89 ETHICS 76, 81 (1978) (stating that “intimacy simply could 
not exist unless people had the opportunity for privacy”). 
24 Charles Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475, 482 (1968).  See also James Rachels, Why 
Privacy Is Important, 4 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 323, 323 (1975) (arguing that privacy is needed “to 
create and maintain different sorts of social relationships with different people”). 
        LOSSES VERSUS VIOLATIONS 
  
7 
governance of the community and its constituent institutions.”25  Highlighting 
that freedom from surveillance is “foundational to the practice of informed 
and reflective citizenship,” Cohen argues that privacy “is an indispensable 
structural feature of liberal democratic political systems.” 26  This general 
position has also been developed by others.27   
2.  Rights of privacy 
Along with providing an account of the interests that are protected by 
privacy, a normative theory of privacy must identify the moral or legal rights 
that we have by virtue of these interests. 28   This is perhaps the most 
contentious issue in the privacy literature, with four broadly-different 
positions being advanced. 
The first set of positions build on the foundational claim of Brandeis 
and Warren that the right of privacy is a right “to be let alone.”29  This 
conception of the right of privacy, which treats it as a negative right, is fairly 
abstract; but it has been developed to include concrete rights restricting 
privacy intrusions and the disclosure of private information.30  These rights 
have been recognized to varying degrees in common law, constitutional law, 
and statute.  Recently, Lior Strahilevitz has proposed combining these two 
rights into a single right that could be used as the basis for reunifying privacy 
law across multiple areas.31 
                                               
25 Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject as Object 
Symposium: Cyberspace and Privacy: A New Legal Paradigm, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1373, 1426 
(2000). 
26 Julie E. Cohen, What Is Privacy For, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1904, 1905 (2013). 
27 E.g., Ruth Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of Law, 89 YALE L.J. 421, 423 (1980) 
(arguing that privacy is important because it promotes “liberty, autonomy, selfhood, and human 
relations, and furthering the existence of a free society”); PRISCILLA M. REGAN, LEGISLATING 
PRIVACY: TECHNOLOGY, SOCIAL VALUES, AND PUBLIC POLICY 213 (1995) (“Privacy…has value 
not just to the individual as an individual or to all individuals in common but also to the 
democratic political system.”); SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY, supra note 2, at 93. 
28 Another underlying question here is whether and how privacy rights are distinct from 
other rights that seem to provide similar protections.  Compare Judith Jarvis Thomson, The 
Right to Privacy, PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 295 (1975) (arguing that privacy rights are reducible to 
other rights) with Thomas Scanlon, Thomson on Privacy, 4 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 315 (1975) 
(rejecting Thomson’s reductionism). 
29 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 17, at 205. 
30 These are the two core privacy rights identified by Prosser in his foundational work.  
William Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383 (1960).  I set aside his other two privacy torts 
(misappropriation of identify and false light), as Prosser admits that they do not cohere, and his 
suggestion that they are privacy rights is often rejected.  See, e.g., Gerety, supra note 2, at 246–
81 (arguing that only the intrusion and disclosure torts are truly concerned with privacy); 
RICHARD POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 272–73 (1981) (identifying seclusion and 
concealment as the core of privacy). 
31 See generally Strahilevitz, supra note 9. 
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The second set of positions, which develop privacy into a positive 
rather than negative right, define it as a right to informational control.32  This 
conception of privacy became influential in the 1960s through the work of 
Alan Westin, who argued that privacy is “the claim of individuals, groups, or 
institutions to determine for themselves when, how, and to what extent 
information about them is communicated to others,”33 as well as Charles 
Fried, who defined privacy as “the control we have over information about 
ourselves.”34  In the following decades, this control-based definition was 
widely advanced,35 sometimes with further refinements.36  
The third set of positions characterize informational control as just 
one aspect of a broader privacy right—a right that encompasses various forms 
of decisional autonomy.  For example, Julie Inness defines privacy as “the 
state of possessing control over a realm of intimate decisions, which include 
decisions about intimate access, intimate information, and intimate actions.”37  
This conception of privacy rights was also adopted by the Supreme Court in 
its decisions establishing rights to contraception and abortion under the 
Constitution.  It originally referred to these as privacy rights, but it no longer 
does so,38 in line with the widespread criticism that the interest at stake in 
these cases is liberty, not privacy.39  I will likewise exclude pure liberty rights 
from my analysis of privacy.40  
The fourth approach to privacy rights argues that they are context-
dependent rights governing the transmission of personal information.  For 
example, Helen Nissenbaum argues that “a right to privacy is neither a right 
to secrecy nor a right to control but a right to appropriate flow of personal 
information,”41 and that the content of this right is defined in terms of social 
                                               
32 See generally Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, supra note 3, at 1109–15 (discussing 
this approach). 
33 ALAN WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 15 (1967). 
34 Fried, supra note 24, at 482.  
35 E.g., ARTHUR RAPHAEL MILLER, THE ASSAULT ON PRIVACY: COMPUTERS, DATA BANKS, 
AND DOSSIERS 25 (1971) (defining privacy as “the individual's ability to control the circulation 
of information relating to him”). 
36 For example, Richard Parker specified the information pathways to which control might 
apply: “The definition of privacy defended in this article is that privacy is control over when 
and by whom the various parts of us can be sensed by others. By ‘sensed,’ is meant simply 
seen, heard, touched, smelled, or tasted.” Richard B. Parker, A Definition of Privacy, 27 
RUTGERS L. REV. 275, 281 (1973). 
37 INNESS, supra note 23, at 140. 
38 Jamal Greene, The So-Called Right to Privacy, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 715 (2009). 
39 See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1352 (2d ed. 1988); 
Louis Henkin, Privacy and Autonomy, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 1410, 1410–11 (1974); Gross, supra 
note 6, at 38; Gavison, supra note 27, at 438–39.   
40 Note that some decisional non-interference rights are not purely about autonomy, but 
rather have an information privacy component.  Neil Richards, The Information Privacy Law 
Project, 94 Geo. L.J. 1087, 1106–16 (2006).  
41 NISSENBAUM, supra note 8, at 127. 
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norms: “Inappropriate information flows are those that violate context 
specific informational norms … a subclass of general norms governing 
respective social contexts.”42  These norms differ depending on the type of 
information at issue, the actors involved, and the principles under which the 
information is transmitted.43  Highlighting the role of context in determining 
the content of privacy rights, Nissenbaum suggests that the right to privacy is 
a right to “contextual integrity.”44   
3.  The domain of privacy 
In addition to providing an account of the content of privacy rights, a 
normative theory of privacy might specify and thereby limit the conduct or 
matters to which they apply—what might be called the domain of privacy 
rights.  For example, it is often suggested that informational privacy rights 
only apply to certain types of information that can be properly classified as 
private.45  In specifying what information counts, many privacy scholars have 
identified “intimacy” as a key criterion. 46   But this approach has been 
criticized for failing to protect other important aspects of privacy.47  There is 
also a growing view that the domain of privacy rights cannot be defined 
categorially, but rather must be responsive to context.48 
B.  Descriptive Theories 
While recent debates about privacy have focused on the normative 
questions identified above, privacy is not only a normative concept of law or 
                                               
42 Id. at 9.   
43 Helen Nissenbaum, Respecting Context to Protect Privacy: Why Meaning Matters, SCI. 
& ENG. ETHICS 1 (2015). 
44 A related position is advanced by Solove, who argues: “Privacy is a dimension of 
certain practices and aspects of life…. Privacy invasions disrupt and sometimes completely 
annihilate certain practices.”  Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, supra note 3, at 1129.  See also 
Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Privacy: Community and Self in the Common Law 
Tort, 77 CAL. L. REV. 957 (1989) (defining privacy rights in terms of social norms of civility). 
45 See, e.g., Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, supra note 3, at 1104.  A related normative 
claim is that information can be private even if it is known to others.  Id. at 1108–9.   
46 See, e.g., INNESS, supra note 23, at 56 (stating that “privacy is the state of the agent 
having control over a realm of intimacy, which contains her decisions about intimate access to 
herself (including intimate information) and her decisions about her own intimate actions”). 
47 See, e.g., Gerety, supra note 2, at 282 n.175 (arguing that it is a mistake to think that 
intimacy is “reducible to what may be its paradigm, sexual intimacy”).   
48 See, e.g., Parker, supra note 36, at 279 (“It is tempting to try and limit the definition of 
privacy to control over certain items of information. But this approach is a mistake. Although 
there is some information which seems peculiarly related to privacy…,  a loss of control over 
most items of information about ourselves is sometimes related to privacy and sometimes 
not.”); Marc J. Blitz, Video Surveillance and the Constitution of Public Space: Fitting the 
Fourth Amendment to a World That Tracks Image and Identity, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1349, 1412 
(2004) (providing examples). 
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morality, but also a descriptive one.  It refers not only to rights and interests 
that can be violated, but also to a state of affairs that can be lost.  In having 
two senses—one normative, one descriptive—privacy is similar to many 
other important moral and legal concepts, such as liberty.49  This distinction 
is now often overlooked, but it was once widely recognized as important.50 
Those who have identified and explored the descriptive side of 
privacy have generally defined it in terms of “limited access” to some 
dimension of one’s self.  For example, Hyman Gross defined the condition of 
privacy as “the condition of human life in which acquaintance with a person 
or with affairs of his life which are personal to him is limited,”51 David 
O’Brien defined it as “an existential condition of limited access to an 
individual’s life experiences and engagements,”52 and William Parent defined 
it as “the condition of not having undocumented personal knowledge about 
one possessed by others.”53 
As I will ultimately advance a version of this approach, I will at this 
point merely highlight three issues along which limited access theories 
sometimes diverge.  First, there is the question of whether access can be 
completely defined in informational terms, or whether non-informational 
access can cause privacy losses.54  Second, there is the question of whether a 
person—informational or otherwise—must be actually be accessed to cause 
a privacy loss, or whether mere accessibility is sufficient.55  Third, there is the 
                                               
49 See supra note 5.  
50 See, e.g., Schoeman, supra note 6, at 3 (highlighting the importance of differentiating 
“the question of whether or not one has undergone a loss of privacy from the questions of 
whether or not one’s right to privacy has been infringed or violated”); Parent, supra note 6, at 
309 (“The concept of a right to privacy is quite different from and should not be confused with 
the concept of privacy simpliciter”); Gross, supra note 6, at 35–36 (“Privacy is a state of affairs, 
and before we speak of ‘rights of’ or ‘interests in’ or ‘invasions of’ it, we ought to be acquainted 
with its distinguishing features.”); O’Brien, supra note 3, at 75 (criticizing the privacy 
literature’s “failure to adequately distinguish between the concept of privacy and a right to 
privacy”).  The distinction is now often overlooked, or if acknowledged, dismissed as 
unimportant.  See, e.g., Moore, supra note 6, at 421 (concluding that “we should not be overly 
worried about defining a state or condition precisely”).  But there are exceptions, such as 
Powers, supra note 6.   
51 Gross, supra note 6, at 35–36. 
52 O’Brien, supra note 3, at 75. 
53 Parent, supra note 6, at 269. 
54 For example, Ruth Gavison rejects the pure informational approach, arguing that the 
condition of privacy consists of limited access across three dimensions: secrecy, anonymity, 
and solitude. Gavison, supra note 27, at 428. 
55 For example, Anita Allen tracks Gavison’s three-prong definition, except for the fact 
that she adopts a criterion of limited inaccessibility rather than limited access: “My own 
restricted-access definition of privacy is this: personal privacy is a condition of inaccessibility 
of the person, his or her mental states, or information about the person to the senses or 
surveillance devices of others.”  ANITA L. ALLEN, UNEASY ACCESS: PRIVACY FOR WOMEN IN A 
FREE SOCIETY 15 (1988).  The difference between access and accessibility is highly significant 
for reasons discussed in Part III.A. 
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question of whether the limitation on access or accessibility must be desired 
by the person to count as privacy, or whether privacy can be imposed. 56   
It is also possible to depart entirely from the limited access 
framework in defining the condition of privacy.  For example, drawing on 
normative theories of privacy, one could argue that “informational control” 
describes not only the right of privacy, but also the condition of privacy.  On 
this account, privacy would not exist, as a descriptive matter, when an 
individual lacks informational control.  However, this approach is 
uncommon—and for good reasons, which I will discuss in Part III, after first 
demonstrating the more basic problems of conflation. 
II.  CONFLATION ERRORS 
Having identified the distinction between normative and descriptive 
theories of privacy—and the different questions that they might seek to 
answer—I will now demonstrate how their conflation has given rise to two 
related errors in a significant body of privacy literature: mistargeted critique, 
in which descriptive theories are rejected for failing to answer normative 
questions; and misguided skepticism, in which the failure to differentiate 
between them has resulted in the mistaken conclusion that a unified theory of 
privacy is unattainable.   
A.  Mistargeted Critique  
A large body of critical scholarship suffers from a type of logical error 
known as a “category mistake,” in which something that belongs in one 
category is treated as though it belongs to a different category.  Often, 
category errors occur when an object of critique is treated as though it has, or 
should have, a property that it cannot have.  In the privacy literature, this is 
widespread: descriptive theories of privacy are often rejected for failing to 
provide answers to normative questions.  This can be seen in three widespread 
critiques of limited access theories of privacy, which track the taxonomic 
analysis developed above.  
In the first critique, limited access theories are rejected for failing to 
provide an account of interests protected by privacy.  For example, Dan 
Solove argues that many limited accessed theories should be rejected on the 
                                               
56  For example, Sissela Bok tracks Gavison’s three-prong definition, but with the 
additional requirement that the lack of access across the three dimensions be desired by the 
person at issue: “I shall define privacy as the condition of being protected from unwanted 
access by others — either physical access, personal information or attention.”  SISSELA BOK, 
SECRETS: ON THE ETHICS OF CONCEALMENT AND REVELATION 10 (1982).  But see ALLEN, supra 
note 55, at 27 (“Privacy aptly describes even some conditions of unwanted inaccessibility.”).  
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grounds that they fail to provide an account of the “value of privacy,” which 
he states is needed to answer important questions about the nature of privacy 
rights and private matters.57  Others make similar claims.58  It should now be 
clear, however, that these complaints are misguided.  They fail to recognize 
the nature of a descriptive theory. 
In the second critique, limited access theories are rejected for failing 
to provide a theory of privacy rights.  For example, many scholars have 
rejected this approach on the grounds that it fails to provide criteria by which 
to differentiate between legitimate and illegitimate modes of acquiring 
information,59 to identify clear cases of privacy violations,60 and to explain 
what is important about privacy rights.61  But again, these criticisms are based 
on a category error: they expect an account of the condition of privacy to be 
an account of the right of privacy.   
In the third critique, limited access theories are rejected for failing to 
identify the domain of privacy rights.  There are two general versions of this 
critique.  The first suggest that limited access theories are under-inclusive 
because personal facts can be known to others, but private.62  The second 
                                               
57  Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, supra note 3, at 1104.  See also SOLOVE, 
UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY, supra note 2, at 20. 
58 See, e.g., INNESS, supra note 23, at 45 (arguing that limited access theories should be 
rejected on the grounds of they define privacy in a value-neutral way); Judith Wagner DeCew, 
The Scope of Privacy in Law and Ethics, 5 LAW & PHIL. 145, 152 (1986) (rejecting William 
Parent’s limited access definition because it provides “no way … to judge what should or 
should not be a part of the public record” and “leaves no room for a normative sense of privacy 
encompassing interests worthy of protection”). 
59 E.g., DeCew, supra note 58, at 152 (rejecting Parent’s definition on these grounds); 
SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY, supra note 2, at 20 (arguing that a problem with limited 
access theories is that they provide “no understanding as to the degree of access necessary to 
constitute a privacy violation”).  
60 E.g., INNESS, supra note 23, at 46–47 (arguing that limited access theories should be 
rejected because they suggest that a person’s privacy is not violated when they must hide to 
avoid being seen by a Peeping Tom).  Likewise, when Inness rejects limited access theories on 
the grounds that privacy and access are not opposed if privacy’s function is “to provide the 
individual with control over certain aspects of her life,” she makes a claim is about privacy 
rights (and their function), not the condition of privacy.  Id. at 6.   
61  E.g., Steve Matthews, Privacy, Separation, and Control, 91 MONIST 130, 141–42 
(2008) (“When we say... it is important to respect a person’s privacy, we surely do not mean it 
is important to respect the mere condition someone is in of being secluded from us… What we 
are respecting is the person’s explicitly expressed choice, or a choice we must presume they 
would reasonably make.”). 
62 E.g., DeCew, supra note 58, at 155 (“[P]rivate information about one’s debts or odd 
behavior may be publicized. Although it is no longer concealed, it is no less private.”); Solove, 
Conceptualizing Privacy, supra note 3, at 1109 (“The books we read, the products we buy, the 
people we associate with—these are often not viewed as secrets, but we nonetheless view them 
as private matters.”). Solove also attributes this position to Stanley Benn, though Benn in fact 
differentiates between the descriptive issue of whether something is done “in private” (which 
he defines in terms of informational access) and the normative question of whether something 
is a “privacy matter” (which he states is both norm-dependent and norm-invoking).  Stanley 
        LOSSES VERSUS VIOLATIONS 
  
13 
version of the critique suggests that they are over-inclusive because personal 
facts can be unknown to others, but not private.63  Setting aside the validity of 
the assumption that some types of information can be categorically classified 
as private (and others as not), which there is good reason to reject,64 the 
problem that I want to highlight is that these critiques assume a normative 
conception of privacy.  What constitutes a “private matter” is determined by 
reference to a conception of the value of privacy or an understanding of the 
types of information that people often want to keep private (i.e., in terms of 
interests in privacy).  Thus, it is a category error to suggest that these critiques 
identify a problem with a limited access theory of privacy, which is 
descriptive and intentionally sets aside the question of when privacy should 
be protected.   
In short, limited access theories are often rejected for failing to 
explain the nature of privacy interests, the content of privacy rights, and the 
domain of privacy—or in other words, for failing to address the three 
elements of normative theories identified above.  In these ways, the common 
critiques all entail category errors.  But this is not the only problem.   
These claims are also unjustified, as they criticize limited access 
theorists for failing to answer normative questions that they do in fact answer.  
For example, DeCew suggests that Parent’s account provides no way to 
“judge what should or should not be a part of the public record,”65 but he does 
address the “criteria for wrongful invasion” in his discussion of the right to 
privacy.66  In addition, Parent and others such as Ruth Gavison and Hyman 
Gross devote large parts of their articles to the value of privacy, after they 
have first defined the condition of privacy in value-neutral terms. 67  
Furthermore, they all clearly explain this structure of their analyses.  For 
example, Hyman Gross explains: “Privacy is a state of affairs, and before we 
                                               
Benn, Privacy, Freedom, and Respect for Persons, PHILOSOPHICAL DIMENSIONS OF PRIVACY: 
AN ANTHOLOGY 223, 223 (Ferdinand D. Schoeman, 1984). 
63 For example, Solove writes: “Without a notion of what matters are private, limited-
access conceptions do not tell us the substantive matters for which access would implicate 
privacy.  Certainly not all access to the self infringes upon privacy.” SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING 
PRIVACY, supra note 2, at 20.  See also DeCew, supra note 58, at 155; Solove, Conceptualizing 
Privacy, supra note 3, at 1111–12.   
64 The problem is that there is not any type of information that is categorically related, or 
unrelated, to privacy.  While there are some types of personal information that most people 
want to keep private (for example, information about sexual habits), this speaks to the value of 
privacy.  Further, this value is ultimately determined by the context of a factual disclosure—
not the type of fact disclosed.  See supra note 48. 
65 DeCew, supra note 58, at 152. 
66  Parent, supra note 6, at 278–88. Likewise, DeCew argues that his “descriptive 
emphasis… leaves no room for a normative sense of privacy encompassing interests worthy of 
protection,”  DeCew, supra note 58, at 152.  But again Parent does in fact address this issue 
when discussing the value of privacy and the right to privacy. Parent, supra note 6, at 278–88. 
67 Parent, supra note 6, at 275–77; Gavison, supra note 27, at 440–55. 
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speak of… ‘interests in’ or ‘invasions of’ it, we ought to be acquainted with 
its distinguishing features.”68 
Thus far, I have argued that the dominant critiques of descriptive 
theories of privacy are mistargeted.  In response, one might argue that the 
entire project of developing a descriptive theory of privacy does not make 
sense—and that this is what underlies the critiques that I have identified.69  
But there would be two problems with this response. First, the critiques that 
have been offered do not actually address the question of whether it makes 
sense to have a non-normative conception of privacy.70  Second, there are 
good reasons to maintain the distinction, including that the term privacy is 
clearly used in both ways in ordinary language and academic writing; the 
failure to recognize this has produced significant confusion in the literature; 
and the distinction allows one to separate questions that should be capable of 
having different answers.  At the very least, a definition of privacy should 
allow for different answers to the questions of whether privacy is protected in 
a given case and whether it should be protected.  The definition should not 
entail the view that privacy should always be protected.71  Another benefit of 
descriptive theories will become apparent in the next section:  they provide 
the basis for a unifying theory of privacy.  
B.  Misguided Skepticism 
1.  Denying coherence 
The failure to distinguish between normative and descriptive theories 
of privacy has generated not only mistargeted critique, but also misguided 
skepticism about the possibility of developing a unified theory of privacy.  
This skepticism has taken two general forms.  Both conclude that we should 
not seek a unified conception of privacy or privacy rights, but they reach this 
conclusion for different reasons.   
The first form of skepticism rejects the coherence of privacy on the 
grounds that there is nothing distinctive about the concept of privacy—
                                               
68 Gross, supra note 6, at 35. 
69 Cf. INNESS, supra note 23, at 44 (arguing that value-neutrality is a reason to reject 
limited access theories of privacy); Moore, supra note 6, at 414 (stating that descriptive 
accounts are “largely uninteresting”). 
70 Moore briefly touches on this issue in discussing Parent’s non-normative definition.  
However, he primarily assumes a normative conception is necessary and criticizes Parent for 
failing to provide one.  Further, he does not address any of the arguments about why it makes 
sense to differentiate and develop both descriptive and normative theories, as Parent does.   
71 Going even further, Parker suggests that an adequate definition of privacy must allow 
us to differentiate between five separate questions:  “(1) whether a person has lost or gained 
privacy, (2) whether he should lose or gain privacy, (3) whether he knows that he has lost or 
gained privacy, (4) whether he approves or disapproves of the loss or gain, and (5) how he 
experiences that loss or gain.”  Parker, supra note 36, at 278. 
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nothing that makes it unique from other concepts.  This position, sometimes 
called “reductionism,” but more accurately called “eliminativism,”72 suggests 
that “our concept of privacy highlights different and unrelated interests in the 
various contexts in which it applies,” such that “all talk of privacy could (and 
perhaps should) be eliminated in favor of talk of the unrelated interests.”73  
For example, Judith Thomson argues that “every right in the right to privacy 
cluster is also in some other right cluster” and  that “the wrongness of every 
violation of the right to privacy can be explained without ever once 
mentioning it.”74  For this reason, Thomson concludes, “there is no need to 
find the that-which-is-in-common to all rights in the right to privacy cluster 
and no need to settle disputes about its boundaries.”75 
The second form of skepticism rejects the eliminativist position and 
maintains that privacy is distinctive, but nevertheless denies its coherence.  
This position has been best developed by Dan Solove, who argues that most 
privacy theorists have created confusion by adopting what he calls the 
“traditional method” of conceptual analysis by which they attempt “to 
articulate what separates privacy from other things, what makes it unique, and 
what identifies it in its various manifestations.”76 Solove argues that it is a 
mistake to search for “the ‘essence’ of privacy”77 and  the “common set of 
necessary and sufficient elements that single out privacy as unique.” 78  
Instead, he  argues, we should understand privacy in terms of Ludwig 
Wittgenstein’s notion of “family resemblances,” which suggests that concepts 
are not held together by a single common characteristic, but rather by a 
common pool of similar elements.79  Wittgenstein illustrates this view of 
language by reference to the concept of a game:  
Consider for example the proceedings that we call ‘games.’  
I mean board-games, card-games, ball-games, Olympic 
games, and so on.... [I]f you look at them you will not see 
                                               
72 The contrary view, non-eliminativism, can take two forms: (1) fundamentalism, which 
maintains that the interest protected by privacy is an irreducible and sui generis interest; and 
(2) reductionism, which maintains that interest protected by privacy can be explained in terms 
of other interests, but that the concept of privacy cannot be eliminated in favor of a more 
fundamental concept.  David Matheson, A Distributive Reductionism About the Right to 
Privacy, 91 MONIST 108, 108–9 (2008).  See also Powers, supra note 6, at 372.  
73 Matheson, supra note 72, at 108. 
74 Thomson, supra note 28, at 313.   
75 Id.  See also Anderson, supra note 4, at 82; Richard Volkman, Privacy as Life, Liberty, 
Property, 5 ETHICS & INFO. TECH. 199 (2003).  
76 Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, supra note 3, at 1095. 
77 Id. at 1096. 
78 Id. at 1095. 
79 Id. at 1090–91. 
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something that is common to all, but similarities, 
relationships, and a whole series of them at that.80   
Drawing on this metaphor, Solove argues: “Wittgenstein’s notion of family 
resemblances frees us from engaging in the debate over necessary and 
sufficient conditions for privacy, from searching for rigid conceptual 
boundaries and common denominator.”81  Instead, Solove argues, privacy 
theorists should adopt a pragmatic orientation and focus on understanding the 
features of different types of activities that can pose privacy problems. 
While Solove’s approach to privacy is illuminating, it is important to 
recognize that it maintains the distinctiveness of privacy by denying that it 
has a core, which gives rise to two related problems that he does not 
sufficiently address.  One problem is that the Wittgensteinian approach to 
language strips concepts of the power to do any normative work.  While it 
does not matter if concepts such as “games” lack coherence, as the concept is 
not employed as the basis of normative claims, the same is not true of the 
concept of privacy, as matters of importance turn on its use.  For example, it 
matters whether the Supreme Court cases recognizing reproductive rights are 
said to be based in principles of privacy or liberty.  This is relevant not only 
to a proper analysis of the interests at stake (as privacy differs in important 
ways from liberty), but also to the legitimacy of the decisions (for example, 
their grounding in the text of the Constitution).  Thus, while Solove’s 
taxonomy of “privacy problems” provides an illuminating account of 
practices that seem troubling to many, it is not clear that they entail the 
violation of privacy rights (or of other rights).   
A related problem, identified by Ryan Calo, is that a Wittgensteinian 
approach treats classification as a pure matter of social convention: an activity 
counts as a “privacy problem,” or not, based only whether it has achieved a 
sufficient degree of social recognition as such.82  Thus, this approach provides 
no grounds for challenging a societal consensus about what counts as a 
privacy problem—and more problematically, it rejects the possibility of doing 
so.  For example, if enough people were to agree that there can be no privacy 
in public or that non-persons can have privacy, these positions would thereby 
be correct.  As Calo highlights, there would be no way of “denying that a 
given harm is a privacy harm… [or] arguing that a new harm should be 
included as a privacy harm, before the right sorts of authorities have 
                                               
80  LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS sections 65-66 (Third ed. 
1958). 
81 Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, supra note 3, at 1126. 
82 Ryan Calo, The Boundaries of Privacy Harm, 86 INDIANA L.J. 1131, 1141 (2011).  See 
also SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY, supra note 2, at 101–2, 172 (acknowledging this 
aspect of his account). 
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recognized it as such.”83  Instead, one would just need to wait until they had 
done so.84   
In response to this criticism, one might argue that although the 
Wittgensteinian approach has these limitations, they are unavoidable if one 
wants to adopt a theory that can capture the heterogeneity of privacy that has 
been recognized in the literature.  But this would be incorrect.  Even if were 
true that the interests protected by privacy fail to cohere at a fundamental 
level, it would not necessarily follow that privacy lacks a distinctive core (as 
Thomson concludes) or unified core (as Solove concludes).  To identify the 
problem with both of these conclusions, it is necessary to first differentiate 
between two ways in which a theory of privacy could potentially cohere.85   
2.  Rethinking coherence 
The first possible form of coherence, which the privacy literature has 
generally assumed is the only possibility, is normative coherence.  On this 
approach, coherence would be achieved by identifying the criteria that 
uniquely justify all the rights that we consider to be privacy rights.  This is 
goal of what Solove calls the “traditional approach” to conceptualizing 
privacy.  While this goal has generally been assumed rather than chosen (as 
the alternative of descriptive coherence has generally not been recognized), it 
is nevertheless widely stated as the goal of theorizing privacy.  For example, 
Reiman states: “What we are looking for is a fundamental interest . . . which 
provides a basis for a right to privacy to which all human beings are 
entitled.”86   
The assumption that normative coherence is the goal of theorizing 
privacy is not only found in those who adopt the “traditional approach,” but 
also in its critics.  The growing skepticism about the possibility of developing 
a unified account of privacy assumes that normative coherence is the only 
form of coherence.  It is only on the basis of this assumption that the 
heterogeneity of interests protected by privacy—and the intractable 
disagreement in the privacy literature—answers the question of whether a 
common account of privacy can be identified.  But this assumption is 
unjustified, as normative coherence is not the only way in which the concept 
of privacy might cohere. 
                                               
83 Calo, supra note 82, at 1141. 
84 Id. 
85 In developing this distinction, I draw on Madison Powers’s very helpful distinction 
between “justificatory reductionism” and “definitional reductionism.”  Powers, supra note 6, 
at 384–85. 
86 Reiman, supra note 18, at 38.  See also James Rachels, Why Privacy Is Important, 4 
PHILOSOPHY & PUBLIC AFFAIRS 323, 333 (1975) (“[T]he first element of a theory of privacy 
should be a characterization of the special interest we have in being able to be free from certain 
kinds of intrusions”).  
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The second possibility, which has been largely overlooked in the 
literature, is descriptive coherence.  Under this approach, coherence would be 
achieved by identifying the state of affairs that is uniquely described as the 
condition of privacy.  The benefit of this approach is that it can accommodate 
the heterogeneity of the value of privacy.  As Alan Rubel explains in another 
context:  
There is little reason . . .  to think that privacy has a single 
type of value. Privacy regarding one’s voting habits with 
respect to state actors may be an important political value, 
whereas privacy regarding one’s shopping habits with 
respect to marketers may be instrumentally valuable.  Indeed, 
many instances of privacy loss are likely of no moral 
concern.87   
A descriptive theory can accommodate this heterogeneity by locating the 
coherence of privacy in a state of affairs, rather than the moral value of this 
state of affairs.  Although a descriptive theory needs to be supplemented by a 
normative theory if we are to determine when privacy violations occur, this 
approach “ensures that we are talking about the same subject when we use the 
language of privacy rights.”88  So before exploring questions about privacy 
rights and their violation, it is essential to clarify the nature of privacy losses. 
III.  PRIVACY LOSSES 
I have thus far argued that the failure to differentiate between 
descriptive and normative theories of privacy—between privacy as a value-
neutral state of affairs that can be lost, and privacy as a right that can be 
violated—has generated misguided critique and skepticism in the literature.  
In what follows, I turn to the first core question raised by this analysis: the 
question of how we should understand privacy losses.  My analysis of this 
issue will give special consideration to the epistemological dimensions of 
privacy.  Although privacy has frequently been defined in terms of 
knowledge,89  few have explored whether or how the various elements of 
                                               
87 Alan Rubel, The Particularized Judgment Account of Privacy, 17 RES PUBLICA 275 
(2011).  Likewise, Madison Powers concludes that we should “doubt that any value could be 
adequate to account for all cases in which privacy matters, or to suppose that any grouping of 
these diverse values uniquely supports privacy rights rather than rights of some other sort.”  
Powers, supra note 6, at 385.   
88 Powers, supra note 6, at 386. 
89 This approach dates back at least as far as 1890 when, shortly before Brandeis and 
Warren published their canonical article, E.L. Godkin defined the “right to privacy” as a 
person’s right “to decide how much knowledge of his personal thought and feeling, and how 
much knowledge . . . of his own private doings and affairs . . . the public at large shall have.”  
E.L. Godkin, The Rights of the Citizen, IV—To His Own Reputation, 8 SCRIBNER’S MAGAZINE 
58, 65 (1890).  More recently, knowledge has been incorporated into limited-access definitions 
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knowledge are actually essential to privacy losses (or privacy violations).90  
My argument, in short, will be that a privacy loss occurs when a person or 
fact about a person is accessed in a way that has epistemic merit. 91  There are 
three essential criteria in this account: access, epistemic merit, and truth. 
A.  Access 
It is uncontroversial to suggest that access is at the core of many 
paradigmatic cases of privacy losses (such as those caused by wiretapping, 
computer hacking, physical surveillance, and the like), but my claim that it is 
an essential criterion faces three sets of challenges.   
1.  Mere accessibility 
The first set of challenges comes from theorists who argue that 
privacy should be understood in terms of limited accessibility, rather than 
limited access.  Anita Allen, for example, argues that privacy is the “condition 
of inaccessibility of the person, his or her mental states, or information about 
the person to the senses or surveillance devices of others.”92  On this account, 
a privacy loss occurs whenever information becomes accessible to others, 
regardless of whether the information is ultimately accessed, and cases of 
complete though unexploited accessibility are “not adequately described as 
conditions of privacy.” 93   If this is right, various new data-mining and 
processing technologies could generate privacy losses merely by increasing 
the accessibility of personal data. 94   
                                               
of privacy, e.g., Gavison, supra note 27, at 423 (privacy concerns “the extent to which we are 
known to others”), as well as control-based definition, e.g., Fried, supra note 24, at 483 
(“Privacy…is control over knowledge about oneself”). 
90 The one notable exception is a small set of articles published in a special issue of the 
journal Episteme on “Privacy, Secrecy, Epistemology” published in Volume 10(2) 2013.  In 
addition, many privacy scholars have indirectly made arguments that are relevant to the 
epistemology of privacy, which I will draw on and refine in my analysis.  
91 While a definition of privacy losses might also limit the types of facts that count, 
attempts to identify categories of “private” information face problems that have been identified 
in the literature.  However, there might be some limits on the type of information that counts 
as a “fact about a person.”  For example, it seems plausible that a person cannot “lose privacy 
about the fact that he is self-identical,” as that fact is not specific to any person.  Don Fallis, 
Privacy and Lack of Knowledge, 10 EPISTEME 153, 156 (2013).  
92 ALLEN, supra note 55, at 15. 
93 Id. at 29 (arguing that privacy would be lost, though not completely). 
94  A similar conclusion would also follow from defining privacy in terms of a low 
likelihood of access, rather than limited accessibility.  While the two criteria will often result 
in the same conclusion—and face similar objections (noted next)—they would result in 
different outcomes in some cases.  For example, an email left open on a public computer might 
be easily accessible, but unlikely to be read (e.g., if the computer is rarely used); whereas an 
email on a secure server might be fairly inaccessible, but likely to be read (e.g., if it contains 
information desired by hackers). 
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In support of this account of privacy as limited accessibility, Allen 
and others have offered a variety of hypotheticals that they think will be seen 
as cases of privacy losses despite the fact that access itself has not occurred.  
Imagine, for example, that a government sets up an extensive camera 
surveillance system but does not turn it on; an ocean wave pulls off one’s 
bathing suit but no one sees; a person finds a lost diary in a park but does not 
read it; or a hacker has access to one’s web-browsing history but chooses not 
to view it.95   
While the intuitive pull of some of these examples is clear, it is a 
mistake to identify them as cases of privacy losses.  To do so is to conflate 
the condition of privacy with the conditions that protect privacy.  These are 
clearly cases in which people’s privacy is not well protected, and in which 
they may not have reasonable expectations of privacy.  But while the 
protection of privacy may be relevant to the question of whether one can 
expect to have privacy in the future, it is not relevant to the question of 
whether one has privacy in the present. 
In response, and in defense of an accessibility of account of privacy, 
one might argue that there are cases in which accessibility is worse than actual 
access.  Compare, for example, the following two scenarios: (1) in which a 
nude photo of you is shared with one and only one person; and (2) in which a 
nude photo of you is made accessible to 100 people.  It seems likely that many 
people would agree that it is worse to be in scenario 2 than it is to be in 
scenario 1—and one might argue that this demonstrates that scenario 2 entails 
a greater privacy loss than scenario 1. 
This argument would mistakenly assume, however, that the 
undesirability in the two scenarios can be best explained in terms in privacy 
losses.  The problem with this assumption can be seen by reference to cases 
involving monetary losses.  Imagine, for example, that you can choose 
between these scenarios: (1) in which you will lose $100; and (2) in which 
you will experience a 10% chance of losing $10,000.  As in the privacy cases, 
it is likely that most people would choose scenario 1 over scenario 2.  But this 
preference does not entail the view that scenario 2 entails a greater loss of 
money—or a loss of money at all.  While it is possible to identify losses and 
risks of losses that are functionally equivalent from an economic perspective, 
it does not follow that the risk entails a loss of money.96   
Of course, the imposition of risk might itself constitute a harm; but 
before getting to this issue, it is worth briefly noting that the economic 
                                               
95  See, e.g., ALLEN, supra note 55, at 29; Alan Rubel, The Particularized Judgment 
Account of Privacy, 17 RES PUBLICA 275, 278, 284 (2011). 
96 If this were the case and a monetary (or privacy) loss occurred at the time the risk was 
imposed, it would follow that a monetary (or privacy) gain would occur when the risk did not 
materialize.  But this account would create confusion that is avoided by the normal way of 
describing this situation: there was a risk of a loss, but the loss did not materialize.   
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perspective does explain why scenario 1 is preferable to 2 in the above cases.  
It is because the probability-weighted value of the loss in the first scenarios is 
greater than it is in the second scenarios.  Furthermore, while all of the cases 
that I have discussed have involved ex-ante uncertainty (about whether a loss 
will occur), the same analysis applies to ex-post uncertainty (about whether a 
loss has occurred).97   
Thus far, I have argued that even if there are cases in which people 
would prefer accessibility to access, this does not suggest that accessibility is 
a form of privacy loss. There are also affirmative reasons to reject this claim.  
The most important of these arise from the fact that it collapses the distinction 
between privacy losses and risks of privacy losses, which generates two 
problems.  
The first problem is that this account is unable to explain the 
qualitative difference between cases of access and cases of accessibility.  
Compare, for example, these two cases: (1) my email has been read by 
hackers, and (2) my email account has been hacked but my emails have not 
been read.  The limited accessibility account of privacy would require us to 
conclude that there is, at most, only a minor quantitative difference between 
these two cases.  But it seems that most would agree that there is a significant 
qualitative difference between a case in which my emails are read and one in 
which they could have been read.   
To be clear, I am not saying that there is a qualitative difference 
between the privacy violations in these two cases.  On this matter, the two 
cases might be similar or the same: for example, if the hackers conduct the 
same type of hack in both situations, the same privacy right may have been 
violated.  But this does not mean that both cases entail a privacy loss.  Rather, 
as I will argue in Part IV, the best account of the nature of privacy rights 
defines them by reference to privacy losses, while allowing for the possibility 
of violations without losses.   
The second problem with the accessibility account is that it collapses 
the distinction, which should be morally relevant, between causing an 
outcome and causing a risk of the outcome.  For example, if A buys 
surveillance technology in order to learn about B (and thereby makes 
information about B more accessible), he would have thereby caused B a 
privacy loss on this account; there would be no difference between causing a 
loss and causing a risk of a loss.  Perhaps an advocate of the limited 
accessibility account would respond that an increased risk of a loss can be 
considered a type of loss.  This position is itself controversial.  But even when 
                                               
97 For example, imagine that you can choose between being person A (who knows that 
his nude photo was shared with 1 person) and person B (whose knows that his nude photo 
might have been shared with 100 people); or A (who has lost $100) and B (who may have lost 
$10,000).  The same analysis applies. 
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this is accepted, there is a recognized moral difference between causing a risk 
of a loss and causing the loss.  
For all these reasons, the condition of privacy should not be defined 
in terms of limited accessibility; this account does not provide a viable 
challenge to the claim that access is necessary for privacy losses.  
2.  Lack of control 
The second challenge to the claim that access is necessary for privacy 
losses comes from privacy theorists who argue privacy consists of control 
over information about oneself. While this account of the nature privacy has 
generally been advanced in normative theories of privacy (and is best 
interpreted as an argument about the content of privacy rights),98 it has also 
appeared in definitions of the condition of privacy,99 suggesting that privacy 
can be lost through losses of control.  But this interpretation of the control 
theory of privacy faces significant problems. 
One problem is that control is clearly not sufficient for privacy, as 
others have noted. 100   Imagine, for instance, that I intentionally share 
previously-secret information about myself with a group of people who have 
an obligation (that I know they will uphold) to seek my permission before 
using or sharing the information with anyone else.  In this scenario, there 
would be no change in my control over my information.  But it seems 
uncontroversial to say that in this case, I have experienced a privacy loss 
(though not a privacy violation), merely because others have learned new 
information about me.  For this reason, privacy cannot be defined simply as 
“control over knowledge about oneself.”101   
To avoid this problem, control-based theories of privacy might be 
interpreted as a supplement, rather than an alternative, to access-based 
theories.  Support for this view (according to which control and limited access 
are both necessary but insufficient conditions for privacy) can be found in the 
work of Charles Fried, one of the most influential advocates of a control-
based theory.  In explaining the role of control in his canonical work on 
privacy, Fried writes:  
As a first approximation, privacy seems to be related to 
secrecy, to limiting the knowledge of others about oneself. 
This notion must be refined. It is not true, for instance, that 
the less that is known about us the more privacy we have.  
                                               
98 Moore, supra note 6, at 417; Parent, supra note 6, at 273 n.11.   
99 E.g., Louis Lusky, Invasion of Privacy: A Clarification of Concepts, 72 COLUM. L. REV. 
693, 709 (1972) (“Privacy is the condition enjoyed by one who can control the communication 
of information about himself.”).  See also O’Brien, supra note 3, at 74 (arguing that a control-
based definition of privacy confuses the condition and right to privacy). 
100 See, e.g., Parent, supra note 6, at 273; O’Brien, supra note 3, at 74. 
101 Fried, supra note 24, at 483. 
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Privacy is not simply an absence of information about us in 
the minds of others; rather it is the control we have over 
information about ourselves.102   
Here, Fried can be interpreted as saying that privacy exists when others have 
limited access to us because we have exercised control over their access.  In 
support of this claim that control is necessary for privacy—that mere lack of 
access is not sufficient—Fried offers the example of an isolated person on a 
desert island: “To refer … to the privacy of a lonely man on a desert island 
would be to engage in irony.  The person who enjoys privacy is able to grant 
or deny access to others.”103   
Before turning to the merits of this claim that control is necessary for 
privacy, three caveats should be noted.  First, it is unclear whether Fried’s 
claim is meant to apply to the value-neutral condition of privacy, or merely to 
the right to privacy.  The latter seems to be the better reading, but I will 
tentatively assume the former, as Fried’s work has been used in this way.  
Second, even if Fried is referring to the value-neutral condition of privacy, it 
is unclear whether the passage is saying that the man on the desert island lacks 
privacy, or merely that the man lacks what is valuable about privacy.  Again, 
the latter seems to be the better reading,104 but I will assume the former for 
the same reason.  Third, it is unclear whether most people would agree that a 
man on a desert island lacks privacy.  This is not my view, but as it is shared 
by some, 105 I will set aside this question, accepting the premise (that the man 
lacks privacy) in order to challenge the conclusion (that privacy requires 
control). 
Even if a man on a desert island lacks privacy as a descriptive matter, 
it does not follow that control is necessary for privacy.  To see the problem 
with this conclusion, it is necessary to clarify the way in which this man would 
lack privacy on the proposed account.  An example helps illustrate this.  
Imagine that the man, before becoming stranded on the island, is on a ship 
with others, where he maintains the privacy of the information in his diary.  
The ship then crashes, and he becomes stranded alone on an island.  
Presumably, no one would claim that at the moment he becomes stranded, he 
experiences a privacy loss with respect to the information in his journal that 
was previously kept private—that he loses privacy because there is no longer 
                                               
102 Id. at 482.   
103 Id.   
104 Support for this interpretation comes from the fact that Fried says that control is 
necessary to “enjoy” (not possess) privacy and that it would be “ironic” (not false) to say the 
person has privacy. 
105 E.g., Graeme T. Laurie, Challenging Medical-Legal Norms: The Role of Autonomy, 
Confidentiality, and Privacy in Protecting Individual and Familial Group Rights in Genetic 
Information, 22 J. LEGAL MED. 1 (2001); SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY, supra note 2, at 
20; INNESS, supra note 23, at 44.  See also WESTIN, supra note 33, at 7 (arguing that “privacy 
is the voluntary and temporary withdrawal of a person from the general society”). 
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anyone to steal and read his diary.  But if this is right and he does not suffer a 
privacy loss at this moment, the man on the island will not lack privacy in an 
ordinary sense, as the contents of his diary will have gone from being 
“private” to “not private” without any privacy loss.  Thus, to the extent that 
the man on the desert island lacks privacy, it is in the technical sense that 
privacy gains/losses are not possible.  But if this is what it meant, the desert 
island example does not pose a challenge to limited access theories of privacy, 
as it ceases to be a case of limited access without privacy.  If the person on 
the island is not in control (in the technical sense that control is impossible), 
then access to the person is not limited (in the technical sense that access is 
impossible).   
Moreover, if control and access limitations are impossible on the 
desert island, the hypothetical is not useful for exploring whether control is 
an essential element of privacy.  To answer the question of whether control is 
necessary for privacy, we must look at cases in which control is possible but 
absent.  (In addition, to eliminate a potentially confounding factor, it is 
important to look at cases where there is no access or risk of access).106  Take, 
for example, a case in which my doctor orders a genetic test with my consent, 
but then decides for clinical reasons to not look at the results or share them 
with me or anyone else; or a case in which the government holds information 
about me but refuses to share it with anyone.  While these are cases in which 
I might not have a right to privacy—as the non-disclosure of my data is being 
imposed rather than chosen—it hard to imagine anyone arguing that this non-
disclosure does not constitute the state of privacy.  The best description of 
these cases is that my privacy (as a state of affairs) is being protected, even 
though I do not choose it.  If so, personal control is not necessary for privacy.   
If one does not have clear intuitions about these cases, however, it 
might help to make a slight modification to the facts.  Imagine, for example, 
that after keeping my results secret for a month, my doctor subsequently 
discloses them to the public.  If personal informational control is necessary 
for privacy (such that I did not have privacy in the first month), then I would 
not suffer a privacy loss when my information was disclosed to the public.  
But this conclusion would clearly be at odds with widespread judgements 
                                               
106 Scholars have offered a variety of examples to support the argument that control is not 
necessary, but many of these confuse the analysis with examples that involve both loss of 
control and an increased risk of disclosure.  For example, it is widely suggested that control-
based theories should be rejected on the grounds that they fail to distinguish between actual 
and threatened losses of privacy: e.g., the difference between a case in which a peeping Tom 
looks inside a house, versus a case in which he is able to do so.  It is suggested that because 
both cases involve a lack of control, they would both be privacy losses on a control-based 
account—and that this conclusion is clearly wrong, so the theory must be rejected.  However, 
this type of counter-example has the potential to confuse matters as the two cases also differ in 
terms of access (in one case, there is access, and in the other, there is risk of access).  It is 
helpful to keep risk of access constant when evaluating the relevance of control.   
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about privacy losses, suggesting that the claim that privacy requires control 
should be rejected.   
In sum, lack of control is neither a necessary nor a sufficient element 
of a privacy loss.  Like accessibility discussed above, lack of control might 
place one’s privacy at risk, but it is not constitutive of the privacy loss.  Thus, 
this theory of privacy does not provide a viable challenge to my core claim 
that privacy losses turn on access. 
3.  Data capture and processing 
The third challenge to the claim that access is necessary for privacy 
losses comes from those who argue that mere data capture and processing can 
cause privacy losses, independently of any human access to the information.  
For example, it has been suggested that privacy is implicated by unmonitored 
surveillance systems, the collection of cell-location data, web-scraping tools, 
algorithms that personalize content, etc.  Setting aside possible control-based 
accounts of the privacy loss caused by these types of technologies (which I 
have rejected for reasons discussed above), there are three main ways in 
which they might be said to cause privacy losses.   
One possibility is that the interactive features of these technologies 
can cause privacy losses.  Take, for example, the Google algorithm that 
“reads” email messages in Gmail accounts and draws inferences about the 
users’ interests in order to provide personalized content.  This type of 
targeting has been said to diminish privacy.107  While the argument here is not 
well-developed, one possible claim is that the display of the personalized 
content causes a privacy loss.  In support of this claim, one might draw a 
comparison to the tort of intrusion upon seclusion, as the receipt of 
personalized content might be as unsettling as an intrusion (especially if it 
reveals interests that one thought were secret; or interests that one had not 
recognized in oneself).  But this would vastly expand the concept of privacy 
losses, capturing cases of non-human intrusions clearly unrelated to privacy, 
such as disturbing noises.   
In order to avoid this problem, one might argue that the privacy loss 
in fact arises from the underlying data processing: for example, the 
algorithmic discovery of a person’s interests, characteristics, etc.  But like the 
intrusion-based argument, this argument would entail an implausible 
expansion of the concept of privacy loss.  It would mean, for example, that a 
privacy loss occurs when an electronic scale displays a person’s weight, or a 
motion detector turns on a light when a person enters a room. 108  In all of 
                                               
107 Cf.  Fallis, supra note 91, at 165 (arguing that privacy is diminished by automated 
targeted advertising). 
108 Cf. Matthew Tokson, Automation and the Fourth Amendment, 96 IOWA L. REV. 581, 
617 (2011) (“[W]ithout some modicum of human observation, disclosure of our information 
to automated systems alone is ultimately no different from ‘disclosure’ to any other inanimate 
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these cases, the technologies gather and process data in order to generate new 
information about the people interacting with them. 
Furthermore, there is a strong argument that automated data 
processing can actually protect against privacy losses. As Richard Posner has 
argued in the surveillance context, “computer sifting prevents most private 
data from being read by an intelligence officer or other human being by 
filtering them out.”109   
This leaves one final possibility: locating the privacy loss in the 
underlying capture of the data. In support of this theory of privacy loss, one 
might cite Jeremey Bentham’s Panopticon, which demonstrates how a 
surveillance system can incentivize prisoners to behave as if they are being 
watched, even if they are not.  Applied outside the prison context, what this 
example illustrates is how data-collecting and data-scraping technologies 
can—even if no person is involved—produce the same type of chilling effects 
on behavior and speech as actual surveillance.  On this basis, one might argue 
that mere data capture can cause a privacy loss.  But the fact that mere data 
capture can have the same deterrent effect as human access does not mean 
that they both cause privacy losses.   
Further, the intuition that privacy is implicated by mere data capture 
seems to be driven by the risk of human access—by the possibility that 
someone will decide to look at the data that has been collected.  An example 
helps illustrate.  Imagine, for instance, that a video camera surveillance 
system records the activities of someone living on a desert island.  In this 
situation, the recording might put the person’s privacy at risk, as it would take 
inaccessible facts and make them potentially accessible (if it is possible that 
someone might access the recording in the future).  But it is hard to see how 
the mere existence of the recording could be said to constitute a privacy loss.   
If this does not seem clear, imagine this further modification of the 
hypothetical: the video cameras on the desert island are turned on and 
capturing data, but they are not recording anything.  This is a case of pure 
momentary data capture, without any confounding factors.  To claim that a 
privacy loss occurs in this scenario would seem to commit one to the further 
view that a privacy loss occurs whenever a picture of a person is momentarily 
created, including by less technologically-sophisticated means.  But if this 
were correct, it would mean that even a mirror would cause a privacy loss—
which presumably is not the view of those who suggest that mere data capture 
causes privacy losses.   
                                               
object that stores our personal data. Automated computers alone do not ‘observe’ us any more 
than a digital bathroom scale observes our weight . . .  or our word-processing document 
observes what we type.”).  
109 RICHARD A. POSNER, NOT A SUICIDE PACT: THE CONSTITUTION IN A TIME OF NATIONAL 
EMERGENCY 97 (2006); see also Tokson, supra note 108, at 617 (“[A]utomated systems are 
increasingly the means by which we maintain privacy in a world where virtually every 
transaction involves the collection of personal information”). 
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In sum, while there is intuitive appeal to the claim that data capture 
and processing technologies can cause privacy losses, independently of any 
human access, this intuition does not withstand scrutiny.  The strongest 
argument in support of it relies on the problematic conception of privacy as 
inaccessibility.  What these intuitions capture is a concern about the risk of 
privacy loss.  In addition, there is another problem with the view that non-
cognitive access can cause a privacy loss, for is as discussed next, there are 
epistemic criteria for privacy losses that non-cognitive access will fail to 
satisfy. 
B.  Epistemic Merit 
My argument thus far—that access is a requirement of privacy 
losses—raises the question of whether any type of access is sufficient, or 
whether it must meet additional epistemic criteria, such as those of 
knowledge.  Although knowledge is included in many limited-access theories 
of privacy (defining privacy in terms of limits on knowledge) and control-
based theories (defining privacy as control over knowledge), this element of 
their definitions has received little attention and there is almost no literature 
on it.110   
The intuition that knowledge might be required to cause a privacy 
loss is not difficult to generate.  Imagine, for example, that I have a dream in 
which I learn a secret piece of information about a person; that I later forget 
that I learned this in a dream and so believe that it is true; and that the 
information happens to be true as a matter of mere chance.  It seems 
uncontroversial to suggest that this person does not suffer a loss of privacy 
via my dream, and that the reason for this is that the belief is not connected in 
any way to the fact that makes it true.  The belief is true merely as a matter of 
luck. 
The idea that mere true beliefs (i.e., beliefs that are true by luck) do 
not count as knowledge dates back at least as far as Plato, but the task of 
identifying the additional epistemic criteria that must be satisfied has 
challenged philosophers for generations.  Increasingly intricate theories have 
been proposed in a vast literature, and there is still no consensus.  Luckily, it 
is possible to answer the question of whether knowledge is required for 
privacy losses without reaching a definitive answer on what counts as 
knowledge.  An understanding of the some of the foundational approaches is 
sufficient to clarify whether knowledge—or as I will propose, a set of 
epistemic desiderata related to knowledge—is an essential element of a 
privacy loss.   
                                               
110 See supra notes 89-90. 
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1.  Theories of knowledge 
A canonical way of explaining why merely true beliefs do not count 
as knowledge is to impose a justification requirement for knowledge.111  This 
is known as the “justified true belief” (JTB) theory of knowledge and requires 
that a true belief be adequately grounded in evidence and reasons to count as 
knowledge.112  This definition has clear intuitive force and was for a long time 
widely accepted.  But it is now generally rejected for failing to exclude cases 
of epistemic luck. This is illustrated by the following non-privacy example 
(which I have created in order to make the following problems and responses 
easier to follow): 
False Premise:  I believe that the lottery number will be 1215 
because I believe that the machine has been rigged, and I 
have good reasons for this belief.  But I am incorrect, and it 
has not been rigged; yet it nevertheless generates the number 
1215 randomly.113   
In this case, I have a belief that is both true and justified; but because the 
justification relies in part on a false premise, my belief is only true by 
coincidence and so is insufficient for knowledge.  This type of problem 
spurred an attempt to find additional criteria to add onto the JTB theory, such 
as a defeasibility criterion, which would require that the justification not be 
                                               
111 The term “justification” is sometimes used in two different ways, which can cause 
some confusion.  The term is traditionally used to refer to when a person has good 
reasons/evidence for a belief and is able to identify those reasons and evidence.  However, the 
term is also occasionally used to refer to other ways in which a belief might be epistemically 
warranted (e.g., the types of warrant identified by the “causal” and “reliabilist” theories 
discussed below).  In the interest of clarity, I will use the term in its narrower traditional sense.   
112 There are different views on the question of how this line of reason-giving must 
ultimately be grounded for a true belief to count as knowledge, but such details are not crucial 
here.  One view is that the process must end in some “foundational reasons” that are not 
supported by other reasons (a position known as “foundationalism”); another view is that the 
process can be grounded in a system of mutually supporting beliefs that cohere (a position 
known as “coherentism”). 
113 This type of counter-example to the JTB theory of knowledge is based on Edmund L. 
Gettier, Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?, 23 ANALYSIS 121 (1963), and is often referred to 
as a “Gettier problem.” 
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undermined by missing evidence.114  But this and other additional criteria 
proved unable to remedy all of the problems with the JTB theory.115   
This led some to reject the entire approach of defining knowledge 
internally (in terms of reasons/evidence), and to instead ground knowledge 
externally.  An early example of this approach is the “causal theory” of 
knowledge, which suggests that a true belief is knowledge only when it is 
caused by the fact that makes it is true: for example, I believe that it is hot 
outside, it is hot, and my belief is caused by the fact that it is hot.  By imposing 
a causation requirement, the theory seems to exclude beliefs that are true 
merely by luck.116  But it soon became clear that this theory was also too 
permissive in some cases, such as:  
Unjustified Trust:  I believe the lottery number will be 1215 
because my friend tells me that the machine is rigged, and the 
                                               
114 The basic idea here is that knowledge does not turn solely on the evidence that one 
possesses (and the reasons for the belief that they provide), but also on the evidence that one 
does not possess.  There cannot be any evidence that would, if one possessed it, undermine the 
justification of one’s belief.  This explains why the case of False Premise is not knowledge.  
This criterion is often attributed to Keith Lehrer & Thomas Paxson, Knowledge: Undefeated 
Justified True Belief, 66 J. PHIL. 225 (1969).  A related earlier proposal was to add a “no false 
lemmas” criterion, which could deal with the problem posed by False Premise, but it soon 
became apparent that it was insufficient for reasons identified in Alvin I. Goldman, 
Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge, 73 J. PHIL. 771 (1976) (proposing the “barn 
facsimiles” hypothetical).   
115 The reason for this is that even when true beliefs are based on good reasons and true 
premises, they might not rise to the level of knowledge.  The problem can be illustrated with a 
slightly-modified case:   
Missing Evidence:  I believe that the lottery number will be 1215, and the reason 
for my belief is that I know it was rigged by my friend yesterday.  What I do 
not know, however, is that another person subsequently fixed the machine, and 
that it was then rigged again in the same way by someone else. 
In this case, all of the above identified criteria are met: my true belief is based on good reasons 
and no false premises (as the machine is in fact rigged), and having access to all the evidence 
(e.g., the fact that it was fixed and rigged again) would not defeat my justified true belief.  Yet 
nevertheless, it would seem that my belief is not epistemically warranted, as it is again only 
true by chance.  It is a matter of pure luck that the machine was rigged again in the same way.  
This is a slightly modified version of the well-known “barn facsimiles” counterexample to the 
“no false lemmas” criterion.  See Goldman, supra note 114 (developing the “barn facsimiles” 
problem).  Unlike in the “barn facsimiles” case (where a justified true belief becomes 
unjustified when new evidence is added), the justified true belief in this case continues to be 
justified after the new evidence is added (though it becomes justified on the basis of different 
evidence).  It is possible that a defeasibility theory could account for the problem in Missing 
Evidence by maintaining that the relevant question is whether the new evidence would alter 
the justification for the belief (rather than rendering the belief unjustified).  However, 
defeasibility theories also face other problems—most notably, the problem of dealing with 
“misleading defeaters.”   
116 This also makes sense of the problem in Missing Evidence, supra note 115:  the 
problem is that my belief is based in the fact that my friend rigged the machine, but that fact is 
not what causes my belief to be true.  Rather, my belief is true because of a different fact (i.e., 
the fact that it was subsequently rigged, after being fixed, by someone else).   
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reason he believes it is rigged is that it is rigged.  I also 
believe that my friend is a compulsive liar and should not be 
trusted, and I have good reasons for this belief; but when he 
tells me the machine is rigged, I believe him anyway (for no 
particular reason).   
According to the causal theory, my belief would be warranted, because the 
causal criterion is satisfied: there is a casual connection between the fact that 
the lottery is rigged, the fact that my friend tells me that it is rigged, and the 
fact that I believe it is rigged.  Yet it seems that I do not have knowledge, 
given that I have compelling reasons to believe that the machine is not broken, 
which I am ignoring for no reason.  Further, while the casual theory is too 
permissive in this type of case,117 it is too restrictive in others. 118   
In order to address some of the limits of the causal theory, 
philosophers developed the third and final theory of knowledge that I will 
discuss: reliabilism.  Instead of requiring an appropriate causal connection 
between the fact and the belief, reliabilist theories require that the process 
resulting in the belief produces true beliefs sufficiently often.  Like the causal 
theory, reliabilist theories provide a fairly straightforward account of what 
makes knowledge non-accidental.  But unlike the causal theory, they can 
explain why I lack knowledge when I rely on the unreliable testimony of my 
friend in Unjustified Trust.  Like the other theories, however, reliabilism also 
has limits that render it an insufficient theory of knowledge.  One core 
problem is illustrated by the following modification to the facts: 
Brain Implant:  I believe that the lottery number is going to 
be 1215 because I have a chip implanted in my brain that is 
connected to the lottery machine, which transmits the number 
to me before displaying it on the screen.  I do not know, 
however, that I am connected to the machine in this way.  I 
just experience a strong belief about what the number will 
be.119 
                                               
117  Notably, the causal theory is also too permissive in other cases, such as this 
modification to Missing Evidence, supra note 115:  Imagine that I believe that the lottery 
number will be 1215 because I know my friend rigged the machine.  What I do not know, 
however, is that there are many different machines that might be used.  By chance, the rigged 
machine is used; so it turns out that I had a justified true belief, and that the truth and 
justification of my belief were caused by the fact that the machine was rigged.  But this was a 
matter of luck; if I had known about the other machines, I would not have been justified in 
believing that the number would be 1215.  Here, the defeasibility criterion explains the nature 
of the problem.   
118 For example, the causal theory would seem to exclude that we can have knowledge of 
a priori propositions (e.g., “7 is a larger number than 6”) and counterfactuals (e.g., “if it had 
not been broken, it would have probably not generated the number 7”), as it is not clear how 
these beliefs can be causally connected to the facts that make them true.  
119 This is based on a frequently discussed counter-example proposed by KEITH LEHRER, 
THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE 163–64 (1990). 
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In this case, my true belief satisfies the basic requirement of the reliability 
theory, but it would be odd to say that I know what the outcome will be, as I 
do not have any reason to think that my belief is true.  In this way, the 
reliabilist theory is insufficiently restrictive, which is just one of several 
grounds on which it has been rejected.120  
2.  Epistemic warrant and privacy  
In light of the challenges facing these and other theories of the nature 
of knowledge (I have only summarized the foundational attempts), some 
philosophers have argued that we should adopt a pluralistic approach to 
knowledge that recognizes a variety of epistemic desiderata.121  Setting aside 
the question of whether pluralism is ultimately satisfying as an approach to 
defining the nature of knowledge (a question that is outside the scope of this 
paper), I will suggest that this approach can be adopted to define the epistemic 
criteria that must be satisfied for privacy losses.  To explain how, it is 
necessary to first take a step back and make two preliminary observations 
regarding the scope of the epistemic criteria that must be satisfied for a 
privacy loss to occur.  
First, at one end of the spectrum, it seems clear that a completely 
unwarranted belief about a person is not sufficient to diminish that person’s 
privacy, for reasons I discussed at the start of this section.  The hypothetical 
of the dream illustrated that in order to cause a privacy loss, personal 
information must be accessed in a way that has some epistemic merit.  The 
belief cannot be true as the result of mere luck.  
Second, at the other end of the spectrum, it seems clear that a privacy 
loss can occur in the absence of knowledge.  Justified true beliefs, for 
example, are not needed, as Anita Allen illustrates with the example of a 
person who reads a celebrity’s diary that is known to contain a mix of “saucy 
facts and fantasy.”122  In this case, the person’s access to facts about the 
celebrity seems to cause a privacy loss, even though the person is not justified 
in believing any particular statement in the diary (given that the person knows 
that any statement could be fantasy).  This suggests that justified true beliefs 
                                               
120 There are four other dominant critiques.  The first problem is that reliability does not 
appear to be necessary for a true belief to be warranted.  Stewart Cohen, Justification and 
Truth, 46 PHIL. STUD. 279 (1984).  The second is the problem of defining the level of generality 
at which the relevant process is defined.  Richard Feldman & Earl Conee, Internalism 
Defended, 38 AM. PHIL. Q. 1 (2001).  The third is the problem of “easy knowledge.”  Jonathan 
Vogel, Reliabilism Leveled, 97 J. PHIL. 602 (2000).  The fourth is the problem of explaining 
why, on a reliabilist theory, knowledge is more valuable than mere true belief.  Linda 
Zagzebski, The Search for the Source of Epistemic Good, 34 METAPHILOSOPHY 12 (2003). 
121 See generally WILLIAM ALSTON, BEYOND JUSTIFICATION: DIMENSIONS OF EPISTEMIC 
EVALUATION (2005). 
122 ALLEN, supra note 55, at 21.  Allen acknowledges that the “justified true belief” is just 
one way of defining knowledge. 
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are not necessary to cause privacy losses—nor by definition are more 
restrictive versions of this general approach, such as those that add 
defeasibility criteria.123   
Likewise, it seems clear that privacy can be lost through access that 
does not take the form of a causal connection.  Imagine, for example, that I 
know—because I have access to data that is not widely known—that all the 
members of a given group (e.g., the group of people who voted for a particular 
political candidate) share a particular trait (e.g., they have an income of over 
a million dollars).  If I then meet someone who tells me that he is a member 
of that group, I will know that he has that trait.  This is a matter of basic logic 
(specifically, the principle of modus ponens).  This suggests that a privacy 
loss can occur in the absence of a causal connection.   
The same is true of reliabilist theories of knowledge: a privacy loss 
can occur even if information is accessed in a way that is not reliable.  Don 
Fallis illustrates this with the example of a compulsive liar who knows a secret 
about someone and discloses it to others who know he is a compulsive liar 
and thus have good reason to doubt him (even though in this case he happens 
to be telling the truth).124  Fallis argues that in this case, the disclosure causes 
privacy loss even though the source is unreliable (and thus cannot support 
knowledge under a reliabilist account) and is known to be unreliable (and thus 
cannot support knowledge under a justification-based account).125  
If the same is true for every other theory of knowledge when 
considered in isolation (which seems plausible, though not necessary to verify 
for reasons that will soon become clear), one might conclude that something 
more than true belief, but less than knowledge, is necessary to cause privacy 
losses.  This is the conclusion reached by Dan Fallis, who is one of the few 
philosophers who has devoted significant attention to this question.126  On the 
basis of this conclusion, he attempts to identify the type of connection 
between belief and fact that is sufficient to cause a privacy loss.  Drawing on 
causal theories of knowledge, he argues that certain types of causal 
connections will be sufficient, though not necessary.127  While this analysis 
by Fallis offers valuable insights, it is limited by the fact that he treats each 
theory of knowledge individually.  In order to identify the necessary 
conditions for privacy losses, it is helpful to look past theories of knowledge 
in isolation.   
                                               
123 For example: imagine that I correctly believe that my friend attended a secret club 
because I saw him entering it; but that unbeknownst to me, he has an identical twin brother 
who also attended the club.  As knowledge of this additional fact would defeat the justification 
for my belief, I would not “know” that my friend attended the club, under this theory of 
knowledge.  But clearly, he would have lost privacy in this fact. 
124 Fallis, supra note 91, at 157. 
125 Id. 
126 Id. at 160. 
127 Id. at 160–61. 
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If instead the competing theories of knowledge are seen 
collectively—i.e., as each identifying one criterion in a broader set of 
epistemic desiderata—a more significant insight emerges: in order to cause a 
privacy loss, the access must satisfy at least one desideratum in this set.  This 
can be seen in all of the examples discussed above (each of which seemed to 
indicate that knowledge was not necessary).  Take, for example, Anita Allen’s 
example of the celebrity diary.  In this case, the justification criterion for 
knowledge is not satisfied, but the causal criterion is: there is a causal 
connection between the saucy facts about the author, the author’s inclusion of 
these facts in his diary, and the reader’s access to these facts.128  In Fallis’s 
example, by contrast, the justification and reliabilist criteria are not satisfied, 
but the causal criterion is: there is a causal connection between the truth of 
the information, the fact that the liar knows it, and the fact that the listener 
thereby gain access to it.  Conversely, in my example of inferred traits, the 
causal criterion is not satisfied, but the justification criterion is (given that the 
belief is based in valid reasons), as is the reliabilist criterion (given that a 
deductive inference from true premises is a reliable means of producing true 
beliefs).   
Furthermore, this pluralist account of the necessary conditions can 
explain cases in which privacy is not lost, such as in the case of true beliefs 
form via dreams.  These true beliefs are not justified, caused by the facts that 
make them true, generated through a reliable process, etc., and so are properly 
excluded from causing privacy losses.   
For ease of reference, I will refer to this requirement of satisfying at 
least one epistemic desideratum in the set—but failing to satisfy all the criteria 
necessary for knowledge—as the requirement of “epistemic merit”. 
C.  Truth 
Thus far in my argument that privacy losses turn on access, I have 
assumed that the object of the access is a physical person or a fact about a 
person.  But this is an assumption that must be explored and justified, as there 
are several privacy scholars who have argued that privacy losses can occur 
through the acquisition and disclosure of false information.129   
1.  Data acquisition 
In support of the argument that privacy losses can occur through 
access to false information, Pierre Le Morvan cites Anita Allen’s example 
                                               
128 In addition, the reliabilist criterion is satisfied, assuming that reading people’s diaries 
is generally a reliable way of learning information about them.   
129 E.g., Johnson, supra note 2, at 162; Rubel, supra note 95, at 277; Pierre Le Morvan, 
Privacy, Secrecy, Fact and Falsehood, 40 J. PHIL. RES. 313, 316–21 (2015). 
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(discussed above) of a celebrity diary containing “saucy facts and fantasy” 
being covertly obtained and read by a stranger.130  While Allen offers the 
example to support the claim that privacy losses do not depend on knowledge, 
Le Morvan uses it to argue that privacy losses do not even depend on true 
beliefs.131  He argues that if the stranger “believes several fantastical entries 
to be true,” the celebrity has “incurred a loss of privacy relative to these 
fantastical entries even though they are false.” 132 
While it might be the case that privacy is implicated in some way in 
this example, it does not necessarily demonstrate that access to false 
information can cause a privacy loss, as there are confounding factors.  Most 
significantly, it seems that this conclusion is driven by the fact that the case 
arguably entails a privacy violation: the stranger’s covert method of obtaining 
the diary may have constituted a privacy violation, even if it did not cause a 
privacy loss.  In addition, the stranger in the case will have gained some true 
knowledge about the celebrity’s diary, even though it leads to false beliefs. 
Without these elements, it is hard to imagine that anyone would think 
that the celebrity’s privacy is implicated.  For example, imagine that the facts 
of the scenario generally stay the same, except for these two changes.  First, 
the stranger finds the diary in a park, so there is no privacy violation.  Second, 
the stranger is mistaken in thinking he has the celebrity’s diary; instead, he 
has the diary of the celebrity’s friend, on the basis of which he develops the 
same false beliefs about the celebrity.  If access to false information about a 
person could cause a privacy loss, we would be forced to conclude that the 
privacy of the celebrity (and not her friend) would be diminished here.  This 
is implausible.  If anyone suffers a privacy loss in this case, it is surely the 
person whose diary has been read.   
The notion that privacy losses can turn on access false information 
also has other untenable implications, including about the privacy 
implications of correcting false beliefs.  While those who advance this 
position have not weighed in on the question of what happens when false 
beliefs are corrected, it seems that they would need to adopt one of two 
possible positions, neither of which is plausible.  One possibility is that access 
to false information creates a privacy loss, and that this privacy loss is not 
modified by the subsequent realization that the information is false.  This 
cannot be right.  If the thief realizes he has the wrong diary, this must alter the 
celebrity’s privacy loss.  The other possibility is that access to false 
information creates a privacy loss, and that this privacy loss ceases to exist 
when the mistake is realized.  But this would mean that privacy losses turn 
entirely on what people think they know, which is incompatible with the 
project of identifying the criteria of privacy as an objective state of affairs.   
                                               
130ALLEN, supra note 55, at 21. 
131 Le Morvan, supra note 129, at 318. 
132 Id.
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2.  Data disclosure 
The claim that access to false information can constitute a privacy 
loss is also often supported with examples involving the disclosure of false 
information.  For example, Alan Rubel offers this hypothetical: “Suppose that 
a healthcare provider confuses medical records such that P’s name is attached 
to the medical history of another. If the provider releases that record, it would 
seem that P’s privacy has diminished.  P has a legitimate complaint against 
the medical provider and that complaint is grounded in a diminution of her 
privacy.”133   
While I imagine that most would agree that P has a legitimate 
complaint in this situation, Rubel’s further claim that this complaint is 
grounded in a loss of privacy is more controversial and must be further 
analyzed.  The reason is that P’s complaint may instead by grounded in a 
related type of harm.  According to Parent, for example: “The spreading of 
falsehoods or purely subjective opinions about a person does not constitute 
an invasion of his privacy. It is condemnable in the language of libel or 
slander.”134  Building on this claim, one might further argue that the intuition 
that privacy is implicated in Rubel’s scenario is motivated by the fact that the 
publication of true and false information can be equally harmful—but that it 
is a mistake to classify all information-related harms as privacy harms.   
This line of objection strikes me as compelling, but it is unclear how 
far it applies.  The open question is whether information-related harms (such 
as those captured by libel and slander) are at the core of all legitimate 
complaints about access to false information.  Rubel argues that they are not.  
In support of this view, he asks that we imagine that in the hypothetical he 
has offered, patient P is benefitted by the release of the false medical records.  
According to Rubel, P would still have a valid complaint: “P’s complaint is 
that the record was released, period—and that release diminishes her 
privacy.135  Again, I imagine that many will share the view that P has a 
legitimate complaint in this case, even if the information is beneficial.  But it 
would be a mistake to conclude, on the basis of this view, that access to false 
information can itself cause a privacy loss.  There are two reasons for this. 
The first reason is that Rubel (like others who argue that 
informational conceptions of privacy are insufficient)136 is making a claim 
about whether P has a privacy-based complaint.  But even if this claim is 
correct, it does not tell us whether P has suffered a privacy loss.  Rather, it 
tells us whether he has suffered a privacy violation, and P can suffer a privacy 
violation without suffering a privacy loss.   
                                               
133 Rubel, supra note 95, at 277.  See also Johnson, supra note 2, at 162. 
134 Parent, supra note 6, at 269 n.1. 
135 Rubel, supra note 95, at 277. 
136 E.g., Johnson, supra note 2, at 160–61; Gavison, supra note 27, at 433. 
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The second problem with Rubel’s conclusion is that the publication 
of information in his hypothetical does provide genuine access to P.  The 
publication puts P into the public gaze, thereby causing a privacy loss (and 
also, possibly, a privacy violation).  In this way, the situation is similar to that 
of a Peeping Tom who looks at a naked person through a hole in the person’s 
fence and develops a false belief that he has a tattoo.  The person in such a 
case suffers a privacy loss, but not by virtue of the false belief; rather, it is 
because the Peeping Tom is in fact looking at him.   
 Finally, if privacy losses could occur through disclosure of false 
information, people would not be able to protect their privacy by disclosing 
false information about themselves to others.  Imagine, for example, that a 
woman who is pregnant tells other people that she is not pregnant in order to 
protect her privacy.  If access to false information can cause privacy losses, 
then the woman would diminish her own privacy (without a privacy violation) 
by spreading this false piece of information about herself.  Perhaps some 
would describe this as a case of a trade-off between privacy losses, in which 
the woman loses privacy with response to the false information but maintains 
privacy with respect to the true information.  But it seems to me that the more 
natural description of this situation is that the woman lies to protect her 
privacy.  This is yet another reason to reject the claim that access to false 
information can itself cause a privacy loss.   
IV.  PRIVACY VIOLATIONS 
The preceding analysis has sought to establish that the concept of 
privacy loss as used in ordinary language is defined and unified in the 
following way:  a privacy loss occurs when a person or fact about a person is 
accessed in a way that has epistemic merit.  Building on this, I will now argue 
that the core of privacy rights is that they restrict the means by which privacy 
losses can occur.  On this account, a person suffers a privacy violation when 
a restriction on the permissible means of obtaining such access is breached.  
Unlike privacy losses, which are outcome-based, privacy violations are path-
based. 
To be clear, this is a primarily an argument about the form of privacy 
violations, and not their substance.  Thus, this theory of privacy does not take 
a position on the question of which means of access are impermissible or what 
types of facts should be protected.  Because it unifies privacy along its 
descriptive rather than its normative dimension, it is compatible with 
disagreement on these and other related normative questions.  For example, it 
is compatible with and provides a foundation for Helen Nissenbaum’s 
argument that privacy rights should be understood as rights to “contextual 
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integrity,”137 as well as Lior Strahilevitz’s argument that privacy rights should 
be focused on protecting interests against intrusion and disclosure. 138   
At the same time, the theory has a critical edge, 139  challenging 
widespread claims about whether and how privacy rights are violated by data 
aggregation, the unconsented use of personal data, and the inference of private 
facts from disclosed data.  Paying attention to the loss/violation distinction 
reveals that the scholarship on these issues has misinterpreted key Supreme 
Court cases, including the landmark technology cases of Carpenter v. United 
States 140  and Kyllo v. United States. 141   In addition, it helps clarify the 
normative reasons why privacy rights should not be expanded in the ways that 
have been suggested.   
Note that in exploring the lessons to be learned from my theory of 
privacy violations, I will primarily focus on those that follow from its 
grounding in an access-based account of privacy losses, as these are likely to 
be the most controversial.  But the other two criteria identified above—
epistemic merit and truth—also highlight important questions that require 
further attention, which I will briefly explore in my analysis of the status of 
inferences. 
Finally, it is worth clarifying in advance a crucial feature of the 
relationship between privacy losses and violations on this account. While 
privacy violations are defined terms of privacy losses (which provides for the 
coherence of privacy rights), this does not mean that a privacy violation can 
only occur if privacy is in fact lost.  Rather, a restriction on a means of access 
that is meant to protect against privacy losses can be violated even if access 
to the person is not ultimately achieved.142   
A.  The Path-Based Element 
The role of the means of access in privacy violations has received 
little explicit attention in the literature, but upon analysis, it is clear that 
privacy rights do not restrict access per se.  Rather, they restrict specific means 
                                               
137 On Nissenbaum’s theory of privacy as contextual integrity, the right to privacy is “the 
right to appropriate flow of personal information,” and “inappropriate information flows are 
those that violate context specific informational norms,” which differ depending on the type of 
information at issue, the actors involved, and the principles under which the information is 
transmitted.  NISSENBAUM, supra note 8, at 9, 127.   
138 See generally Strahilevitz, supra note 9. 
139 Cf. DWORKIN, supra note 10, at 116–18 (explaining that the theory that best fits and 
justifies an area of law will often not fit all of our judgements about it; rather, to achieve 
coherence, it will often find some judgements to be mistaken or misconceived). 
140 Carpenter v. United States, 139 S.Ct. 2206 (2018). 
141 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001). 
142 This is in line with the decisions in Amati v. City of Woodstock, 829 F. Supp. 998, 
1010-11 (N.D. Ill. 1993); Harkey v. Abate, 346 N.W.2d 74, 76 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983); 
Hamberger v. Eastman, 206 A.2d 239, 243 (N.H. 1965).   
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of access (which I will refer to as “path-based” restrictions for short).  This 
can be seen across our core constitutional, statutory, and common law privacy 
rights.   
For example, the Fourth Amendment’s protection of “reasonable 
expectations of privacy” does not protect a reasonable expectation that a given 
piece of information will not be accessed (i.e., that the person will not suffer 
a privacy loss), but rather that the information will not be accessed in certain 
unexpected ways. This feature of the Supreme Court’s Katz jurisprudence has 
often been overlooked in the literature (giving rise to some confusion 
discussed in the next section), but it is hard to imagine anyone rejecting my 
claim.  For example, as United States v. Jones highlights, it is impermissible 
to track a person’s movements with GPS for an extended period, but 
permissible to do so by following them in a car, even if both methods reveal 
the same location data.143  Even information in the home is protected by path-
based restrictions, as the Court explains in Kyllo.144   
The core privacy statutes of state and federal law also do not restrict 
access, but rather specific means of access: for example, wiretapping 
telephones, intercepting electronic communications, using two-way mirrors 
in specified areas, and looking through the windows of a home.145  Likewise, 
the common law tort of intrusion on seclusion only provides a cause of action 
if the means of access is highly offensive to a reasonable person.146 
The same is true of rights restricting the generation of access via 
disclosure.  Take, for example, the constitutional right to information privacy, 
which has been assumed (though not formally recognized) by the Supreme 
Court.147  In Whalen v. Roe,148 the Court held that the Constitution might 
protect an “individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters,” but 
that this would only require the state to avoid unreasonable disclosure.  As the 
state had taken adequate security measures (i.e., it had restricted the pathways 
                                               
143 United States v. Jones, 656 U.S. 400 (2012).  
144 The Court frames the point from the other direction, but its substance is the same: “The 
police might, for example, learn how many people are in a particular house by setting up year-
round surveillance; but that does not make breaking and entering to find out the same 
information lawful.”  Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 35 n.2. 
145 See generally Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, supra note 1, at 491–93. 
146  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §652B (1977).  For example, this has been 
interpreted as providing a right against certain forms of surveillance in public, Nader v. Gen. 
Motors Corp., 255 N.E.2d 765, 770-71 (N.Y. 1970), photography in a medical office, Estate of 
Berthiaume v. Pratt, 365 A.2d 792, 793 (Me. 1976), and audio recording in a bedroom, 
Hamberger v. Eastman, 206 A.2d 239 (N.H. 1964). 
147 In two cases, Supreme Court has stated that it would assume there is such a right for 
the sake of its analysis, but it found that even if there is such a right, it would not have been 
violated.  NASA v. Nelson, 131 S.Ct. 746, 749-51 (2011); Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599 
(1977)).  In NASA v. Nelson, Justice Scalia strongly objected to the Court's working 
assumption, declaring: “A federal constitutional right to ‘informational privacy’ does not 
exist.”  Nelson, 131 S.Ct.  at 764 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
148 429 U.S. 589 (1977). 
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by which disclosure might occur), there was no violation of the right.149  Path-
based restrictions—regarding how and to whom information is disclosed—
can also be found in a wide range of federal privacy laws.150  These laws  also 
generally impose related duties, such data security requirements, which 
likewise restrict means of access.  
Thus, across the various areas of privacy law that restrict acquisition 
and disclosure, privacy violations are path-based: they depend not on whether 
a person or a personal fact has been accessed, but rather on how this has been 
achieved.  (Under most of these rights, a violation also depends on what 
information has been accessed, but that is not relevant here).   
Of course, as a normative matter, one might argue that there is no 
reason why privacy rights should be limited to path-based restrictions.  For 
example, George Brenkert has argued that certain types of information 
acquisition can constitute a privacy violation regardless of the way in which 
they are generated:  
 [T]here are certain things which people (in their various 
roles as employers, government officials, physicians, etc.) 
and institutions (governments and businesses, etc.) ought not 
to know about individuals, however they might come to 
know these facts . . . For example, it would be wrong, 
however they went about it, for government officials to make 
it their business to know the details of the sexual practices of 
each particular citizen.151   
Brenkert further argues that “since they ought not to know such facts, those 
individuals who are the ultimate object of this knowledge may legitimately 
object to a violation of their rights.”152   
While many might agree with Brenkert that it would be wrong for 
government officials to seek to discover the sexual practices of their citizens 
via any means, it does not necessarily follow that that privacy losses can (in 
and of themselves) constitute violations of privacy rights.  Two aspects of this 
conclusion require unpacking.  First, even if one agrees with Brenkert that the 
government official who sees the person engaged in sexual activity “ought 
not to know such facts” about the person, it does not follow that he has a duty 
to not know them (and violates the person’s rights merely by knowing them).  
                                               
149 Some lower courts have gone further and required the government adopt the least 
intrusive means of disclosure.  E.g., Donohue v. Hoey, 109 F. App'x 340, 361 (10th Cir. 2004). 
150 See, e.g., Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1974);  Video Privacy Protection Act 
of 1988, 18 U.S.C. § 2710 (1988); Right to Financial Privacy Act; Driver's Privacy Protection 
Act of 1994, 18 U.S.C. § 2721 (1994); Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 
1996, Pub. L. 104-191, § 1(a), 110 Stat. 1936 (1996); Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. 106-
102, § 1(a), 113 Stat. 1338 (1999) (codified in 12 U.S.C. and 15 U.S.C.) 
151 George G. Brenkert, Privacy, Polygraphs and Work, 1 BUS. & PROF. ETHICS J. 19, 20 
(1981). 
152 Id. 
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Second, the government officials in the hypothetical have intent, which seems 
to drive the intuition that they are behaving wrongfully.  To see this, imagine 
that there is no intent: for example, that a government official walks into a 
public bathroom where a person is engaged in sexual activity.  In this case, it 
is hard to imagine a plausible normative argument that official violated the 
person’s rights.   
Thus, it seems that most would agree with Judith Thomson when she 
writes: “[N]one of us has a right over any fact to the effect that that fact shall 
not be known by others. You may violate a man’s right to privacy by looking 
at him or listening to him; there is no such thing as violating a man’s right to 
privacy by simply knowing something about him.”153  Privacy rights that 
impose access restrictions should—as a positive and normative matter—be 
interpreted as restricting the means of access, not access itself.   
B.  Rethinking Aggregation and Use 
While my argument thus far has focused on privacy rights that restrict 
access, there are practices that are widely said to violate privacy rights without 
violating access restrictions: namely, the aggregation and unconsented use of 
personal data.154  If it is true that these practices violate privacy rights, this 
would pose a problem for my account of privacy violations, along with the 
account of privacy losses that underlies it.  As I will argue, however, they do 
not.  Differentiating between privacy losses and violations reveals the nature 
of the mistake and sheds light on how we should actually understand the 
privacy implications of aggregation and unconsented use. 
1.  Aggregation 
Both advocates and critics of a privacy right against aggregation often 
agree on one point: that courts have rarely recognized such a right, but that 
the Supreme Court did so in the recent landmark case of Carpenter v. United 
States, 155  as well as in United States Department of Justice v. Reporters 
Committee for Freedom of the Press.156  This point of agreement is, however, 
based on a mistaken reading of the two cases.  Attention to the loss/violation 
distinction reveals the mistake and clarifies what the Court actually held.  
In Carpenter, the Court addressed the question of whether the 
government had violated the defendant’s reasonable expectations of privacy 
                                               
153 Thomson, supra note 28, at 307.  See also Scanlon, supra note 28, at 315 (describing 
privacy rights as enforcing “norms specifying when, where, and in what ways we may and may 
not be observed, listened to, questioned, and in other ways kept track of”). 
154 For an overview of these positions in the literature, see Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 
supra note 1, at 505–10. 
155 Carpenter v. United States, 139 S.Ct. 2206 (2018). 
156 US Dept. of Justice v. Reporters Committee, 489 U.S. 749 (1989). 
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under the Fourth Amendment when it obtained historical “cell-site location 
information” (CSLI) data from his wireless carriers.  This included 12,898 
location points over a period 127 days.  Under the Court’s well-established 
“public exposure” doctrine, it seemed that this data would be excluded from 
Fourth Amendment protection.  But in a significant shift, the Court found this 
doctrine inapplicable, in part because of the aggregated nature of the data.  
The Court held that although Carpenter had exposed each of his physical 
movements to different people at different places and times, he had not 
exposed the whole of his physical movements to any single person.157  In other 
words, by reframing the doctrinal question to focus on aggregated data and a 
single observer (rather than disaggregated data and multiple observers), if 
found that the public exposure doctrine did not apply.158  From here, it went 
on to conclude that “individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy in 
the whole of their physical movements,” and that this expectation was 
violated when the government acquired Carpenter’s CSLI data.159   
In holding that individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy 
in the whole of their physical movements, Carpenter has been widely 
described as a radical change in the Court’s Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence.  For example, Orin Kerr states that Carpenter creates an 
entirely new type of search:   
Carpenter holds, for the first time, that a search occurred 
without it being a taking of information from any particular 
place, thing, or person…. [T]he government simply ended up 
with too much information about someone.  How it ended up 
with too much information isn’t particularly relevant in the 
Court’s view. The point is the result, not the process.160 
A similar point is made by others who suggest that Carpenter adopts the 
“mosaic theory” of privacy violations. 161  The mosaic theory has been 
articulated in different ways, but the core idea is that the aggregation of 
information about a person can violate a reasonable expectation of privacy 
because it provides a picture that is greater than the sum of its parts.  For 
example, in Justice Sotomayor’s Jones concurrence, she concludes that the 
aggregation of publicly-exposed location information could violate a 
reasonable expectation of privacy because it could reveal a person’s “familial, 
                                               
157 Carpenter, 139 S.Ct. at 2217. 
158 Evan Caminker, Location Tracking and Digital Data: Can Carpenter Build a Stable 
Privacy Doctrine?, 2019 SUP. CT. REV. __ (forthcoming 2019) (manuscript available at 
papers.ssrn.com/abstract=3304775).   
159 Carpenter, 139 S.Ct. at 2217, 2219. 
160  Orin S. Kerr, When Does a Carpenter Search Start—and When Does It Stop?, 
LAWFARE (July 6, 2018), https://www.lawfareblog.com/when-does-carpenter-search-start-
and-when-does-it-stop.  See also ORIN S. KERR, IMPLEMENTING CARPENTER 6 (manuscript 
available at papers.ssrn.com/abstract=3301257). 
161 See, e.g., Caminker, supra note 158, at 21–25. 
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political, professional, religious, and sexual associations.”162  This language 
is, notably, quoted by the majority in Carpenter.163 
 If it were true that Carpenter recognized a new type of privacy 
violation based entirely on “the result, not the process,” the case would pose 
a challenge to my claim that a core difference between privacy violations and 
losses is that violations are path-based whereas losses are outcome-based.  But 
this interpretation of the case is based on a conflation of two different issues.  
While the Court in Carpenter quotes Sotomayor’s language from Jones, it 
does not follow her in concluding that a reasonable expectation of privacy can 
be violated by the aggregation of publicly-exposed location data.  To see the 
error underlying this widespread reading of the case, it is necessary to 
differentiate between two different questions that arise in the case—questions 
that track the privacy loss/violation distinction.   
The first question is whether Carpenter’s CSLI data is excluded from 
the Fourth Amendment’s privacy protections by virtue of the public exposure 
doctrine.  Note that this is a privacy loss question, asking whether Carpenter 
has already lost privacy in his physical movements.  It is in the Court’s answer 
to this question—not the substantive violation question—that it could be said 
to adopt a version of the mosaic theory.164  As explained above, the Court 
holds that public exposure doctrine does not apply because “the whole” of 
Carpenter’s physical movements (i.e., the mosaic) was never exposed.  For 
this reason, it is eligible for Fourth Amendment protection, giving rise to the 
second question.   
The second question is whether the government’s acquisition of CSLI 
data violated a reasonable expectation of privacy protected by the Fourth 
Amendment.  On this question, the Court does not adopt the mosaic theory, 
but rather recognizes a violation based on the means by which the government 
accessed this information.  The Court’s decision is based on the fact that 
tracking via CSLI data allows “tireless and absolute surveillance” that is 
“retrospective,” “nearly infallible,” and “practically no expense.”165   The 
Court holds that “when the Government accessed CSLI from the wireless 
carriers, it invaded Carpenter’s reasonable expectation of privacy.”166  The 
fact that the means of access was central to the holding is confirmed by the 
Court’s subsequent clarification of its scope: “Our decision today is a narrow 
                                               
162 United States v. Jones, 656 U.S. 400, 955 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
163 Carpenter, 139 S.Ct. at 2217 
164 At times, Caminker suggests that the Court adopted the mosaic theory in this way; but 
at others, he suggests that it adopted it as a theory of privacy violations.  Compare Caminker, 
supra note 158, at 21 (discussing the public exposure question) with id. at 22 (discussing the 
“Court’s first-ever embrace of a mosaic-defined search”).  
165 Carpenter, 139 S.Ct. at 2218–19.  This aspect of the decision is highlighted by Susan 
Freiwald & Stephen W. Smith, The Carpenter Chronicle: A Near Perfect Surveillance, 132 
HARV. L. REV. 205, 219–22 (2018). 
166 Carpenter, 139 S.Ct. at 2219. 
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one. We do not … call into question conventional surveillance techniques and 
tools, such as security cameras.”167  If the government had accessed the same 
information via a different permissible means, there would have been no 
violation.   
Thus, Carpenter does not recognize a right against aggregation, as 
has been widely suggested.  It is not the case that the government merely 
ended up with too much information.  Rather, the process was central to the 
violation.  The Court recognized a privacy right that imposes a path-based 
restriction on access to aggregated data.  Carpenter thus supports my theory 
of the difference between privacy losses and violations, which in turn clarifies 
what is revolutionary about Carpenter—and what is not.  Attention to the 
loss/violation distinction clarifies that the Court did not establish an entirely 
new type of search through aggregation, but rather recognized the possibility 
of privacy in public.  
The same lessons can be drawn from Reporters Committee, which 
has surprising parallels to Carpenter, but in the context of the government’s 
disclosure of aggregated data under the Freedom of Information Act (rather 
than government’s acquisition of data under the Fourth Amendment).  The 
question in this case was whether FOIA’s privacy exemption, which restricts 
disclosures that “could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted 
invasion of personal privacy,” applied to FBI “rap sheets” that aggregated 
criminal information about individuals from various public sources.  The 
Court held that disclosure of this information would constitute an unwarranted 
invasion of personal privacy, and on this basis, Reporters Committee has been 
cited as the first Supreme Court case recognizing that privacy can be violated 
by aggregation. 168   As with the literature on Carpenter, however, this 
conclusion is mistaken because it fails to differentiate between two questions 
that track the loss/violation distinction.   
The first question (the privacy loss question) is whether the 
aggregated data can be considered private if the underlying data is in the 
public domain.  The plaintiffs in Reporters Committee advanced an argument 
similar to the government’s “public exposure” argument in Carpenter, and 
the Court rejected it on similar grounds, concluding that the aggregated data 
provided a picture of the individuals that was not in fact public.169  This 
conclusion has, moreover, been read as recognizing a privacy violation via 
data aggregation. 170  But as with Carpenter, this reading is mistaken. 
                                               
167 Carpenter, 139 S.Ct. at 2220. 
168 See, e.g., Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, supra note 1, at 509. 
169 US Dept. of Justice v. Reporters Committee, 489 U.S. 749, 761 (1989) (“[T]here is a 
vast difference between the public records that might be found after a diligent search of 
courthouse files, county archives, and local police stations throughout the country and a 
computerized summary located in a single clearinghouse of information”).   
170 See, e.g., Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, supra note 1, at 509. 
        LOSSES VERSUS VIOLATIONS 
  
44 
When the Court in Reporters Committee addressed the second 
question (the privacy violation question), it explicitly rejected the claim that 
aggregation violated a privacy right, stating that the Constitution “does 
not prohibit such a compilation.”171  Instead, it held that that disclosure of the 
aggregated data by the government could cause a privacy violation.  Thus, 
Reporters Committee recognized a path-based privacy right—a right to 
prevent the flow of information between two specific parties.  Further, its 
rationale for recognizing this right was also path-based: it was because the 
government was able to require access to the data (i.e., a means of access not 
available to the public) that it had a duty of non-disclosure.172  So again, the 
case supports—and is clarified by—my theory. 
Further, as a normative matter, the fact that the Court did not 
recognize a privacy right against aggregation in either of these cases should 
be seen as a good thing.  There are two core sets of reasons for this. 
One set of reasons arise from the fact that a right against aggregation 
itself would impose an outcome-based restriction, rather than a path-based 
restriction.  This feature of the right is problematic in various ways that have 
been explored in depth in the critical literature on the mosaic theory.  Some 
of the problems identified in this literature are specific to the Fourth 
Amendment context, but the core problems apply more generally.  Orin Kerr, 
for example, has identified a dizzying set of questions that judges would need 
to answer in order to enforce such a right,173 leading many to conclude that 
the theory is unworkable.174  Imagine, for example, a case in which data is 
collected through various different forms of human and technological 
observation: should all the different types of data grouped together in the 
mosaic analysis, or are there multiple groups?—and does this change if the 
data was collected by different people for different purposes?  There are also 
hard quantification questions: for example, if a technology records the 
location of person at 12 pm every day for five days, does this count five 
seconds or five days of location data?  To answer these and related questions, 
it seems that courts would need to draw unprincipled lines.175   
In addition, and perhaps even more troubling, there are the problems 
facing those who want to conform their conduct to the law ex ante.  For 
                                               
171  Reporters Committee, 489 U.S. at 770.  While the Court recognized that the 
accumulation of personal information posed a “threat to privacy,” Reporters Committee, 489 
U.S. at 770, it is important to differentiate between risks and their materialization for reasons 
discussed above.  See Part III.A.1.   
172 Reporters Committee, 489 U.S. at 770.   
173 See generally Orin S. Kerr, The Mosaic Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 111 MICH. 
L. REV. 311 (2012). 
174 See Rebecca Lipman, Protecting Privacy with Fourth Amendment Use Restrictions, 25 
GEO. MASON L. REV. ___, 39 n. 328 (forthcoming) (manuscript available at 
ssrn.com/abstract=2949293). 
175 See Kerr, The Mosaic Theory of the Fourth Amendment, supra note 173, at 346–47. 
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example, a person who collects data using different tools at different times 
might often have no way of knowing whether he is going to end up with a 
privacy-violating mosaic.  Further, data-gathering that is legal at the time that 
it is conducted could, at any point in the future, retroactively become unlawful 
if the data subsequently becomes part of a privacy-violating mosaic.  For these 
reasons, amongst others identified in the literature, the mosaic theory is 
problematic as a theory of privacy violations (though not as a theory of 
privacy losses).  This is one set of reasons why privacy rights should—as a 
normative matter—be defined as imposing path-based restrictions, not 
outcome-based restrictions.176  
Another problem with a right against aggregation that is highlighted 
by the loss/violation distinction arises in a standard account of the way in 
which aggregation violates privacy.  This account suggests that aggregation 
violates privacy by revealing sensitive information that was not visible in the 
disaggregated data.  For example, Solove writes: “People expect certain limits 
on what is known about them and on what others will find out. Aggregation 
upsets these expectations, because it involves the combination of data in new, 
potentially unanticipated ways to reveal facts about a person that are not 
readily known.”177  Likewise, as noted above, Justice Sotomayor’s concurring 
opinion in Jones states that reasonable expectations of privacy are violated 
when personal location information about individuals is “recorded and 
aggregated in a manner that enables the Government to ascertain, more or less 
at will, their political and religious beliefs, sexual habits, and so on.”178   
Paying attention to the path-based element of privacy violations 
reveals a potential problem with this account.  For example, in Sotomayor’s 
example, it highlights that the government is not “acquiring” 
political/religious/sexual information about a person—at least not in the 
ordinary sense of the word.  Rather, the government is inferring it.  And the 
fact that information is being inferred, rather than discovered, is relevant in 
ways that have gone unexplored.  On one hand, it could be argued, this 
account of the privacy violation avoids some of the problems identified above, 
as it locates the violation in the decision to analyze and draw inferences from 
aggregated data (rather than the mere fact that aggregation has occurred).  On 
the other hand, the claim that aggregation can violate privacy on these 
grounds entails the premise that an inference is a means of access that can 
violate privacy rights.  This premise, which has not been recognized or 
defended in the literature, is problematic for reasons that I explore in Section 
                                               
176 This point has been recognized and developed by Gray and Citron, who argue that 
“quantitative privacy” should not be defined in terms of “how much information is gathered in 
a particular case” but rather on “how information is gathered.”  David Gray & Danielle Citron, 
The Right to Quantitative Privacy, 98 MINN. L. REV. 62, 126–30 (2013). 
177 Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, supra note 1, at 507. 
178 United States v. Jones, 656 U.S. 400, 956 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
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C below.  Before doing so, however, it will be helpful to first clarify the issue 
of unconsented use.   
2.  Unconsented use  
The second challenge to my claim that privacy rights impose path-
based restrictions on access comes from the claim that unconsented use of 
personal data can itself violate privacy rights.  If the best theory of privacy 
rights includes rights that restrict unconsented use per se—thereby protecting 
pure informational autonomy—these rights would pose a challenge to my 
account.  But as with aggregation, this expansive interpretation of use 
restrictions should be rejected. 
To start with matters of existing law, this position is at best only 
plausible with respect to a limited set of privacy rights, and even in the case 
of this limited set, the claim should ultimately be rejected.  There are four core 
points here: two about limits, and two about deeper problems. 
First, a right to restrict or control the use of one’s information is not 
protected by any of the foundational areas of privacy law, including the 
Fourth Amendment, 179  the common law privacy torts, 180  and the 
constitutional right to informational privacy.181  Insofar as there is such a 
right, it is to be found in sector-specific privacy laws that have their origin in 
set of  “principles of fair information practice” set out in a 1973 report by the 
U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare.  Among these principles 
is a “purpose specification” principle restricting use: “There must be a way 
for an individual to prevent information about him obtained for one purpose 
from being used or made available for other purposes without his consent.”182  
Whether this is accurately described as a principle of privacy, as is widely 
suggested, is question to which I will return below.  
                                               
179 See Elizabeth E. Joh, Policing by Numbers: Big Data and the Fourth Amendment, 89 
WASH. L. REV. 35, 63 (2014) (“The Fourth Amendment is primarily interested in the legitimacy 
of how information is acquired.  If the acquisition is permissible, how the police use that 
information thereafter is generally not subject to an additional Fourth Amendment challenge.”).  
While Ric Simmons suggests that “we have seen growing numbers of lower courts turning to 
use restrictions to solve some of the modern problems posed by technology and the Fourth 
Amendment,” Ric Simmons, The Mirage of Use Restrictions, 96 N.C. L. REV. 133, 180 (2017), 
he acknowledges that these are not “use restrictions” in the traditional senses.  Id. at 198.  In 
fact, these restrictions are better characterized as a type of access restriction:  the courts have 
held that when the police seize data in bulk (e.g., through seizing a hard drive), the act of 
accessing the data can constitute a new search that must be independently justified.   
180 Anupam Chander, How Law Made Silicon Valley, 63 EMORY L.J. 640, 664–65 (2014); 
Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1609, 1634 
(1999). 
181  Daniel J. Solove, Privacy and Power: Computer Databases and Metaphors for 
Information Privacy, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1393, 1436 (2001). 
182 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, RECORDS, COMPUTERS, 
AND THE RIGHTS OF CITIZENS 41 (1973). 
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Second, even within the limited set of laws that adopt the purpose 
specification principle, use itself is not always restricted.  For example, the 
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 has a section titled “limits on reuse of 
information,” but this section actually only restricts access, limiting the 
parties to whom personal information may be disclosed.183  Furthermore, 
many statutes that do restrict use connect this restriction to an access 
restriction.184  There are only a few statutes that impose access-independent 
use restrictions.185   
Third, while it has been suggested that these use restrictions provide 
rights against unconsented use, embodying the idea of privacy-as-control,186 
this characterization misses an important point: the use and transfer of the data 
is often not under the person’s control.187  Although unconsented uses beyond 
those authorized by the statutes are not permitted, the data subject is not in 
control of the uses that are authorized.  For example, under the Fair Credit 
Reporting Act, consumers are not provided with the opportunity to opt-out of 
the creation, disclosure, and use of credit reports about them, 188  which 
suggests that the use restrictions are really about protecting fairness.   
Fourth, the claim that these statutes provide rights against 
unconsented use is undercut by the fact that the restrictions are eliminated by 
anonymization (including in limited forms, such as pseudonymization and 
data perturbation).  This is the case with the Freedom of Information Act,189 
                                               
183 15 U.S.C.A. § 6802(c).  Likewise, the Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988 only 
imposes restrictions on the parties to whom records may be disclosed, and the Cable 
Communications Policy Act of 1984 only restricts data collection and storage.  47 U.S.C.A. § 
551. 
184 For example, under the Fair Credit Reporting Act, a consumer reporting agency can 
provide a credit report to a third party only for limited purposes (an access restriction), and any 
subsequent use must be in accordance with one of these permissible purposes (the use 
restriction).  See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681b(a), 1681e(e) (2000).  The same structure can be found in 
the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act.  See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2721 (the access restriction), § 2724 
(the use restriction). 
185  For example, the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act regulations 
impose a wide range of restrictions on the use of medical information (beyond those necessary 
for treatment, payment, and health care operations), 45 C.F.R. § 164.508, and the Federal 
Election Campaign Act states that documents filed with Commission “may not be sold or used 
by any person for the purpose of soliciting contributions or for commercial purposes,” 52 
U.S.C.A. § 30111.   
186 Michael D. Birnhack, A Quest for a Theory of Privacy: Context and Control, 51 
JURIMETRICS 447, 477–78 (2011). 
187 Paul M. Schwartz, Beyond Lessig’s Code for Internet Privacy: Cyberspace Filters, 
Privacy Control and Fair Information Practices, 2000 WIS. L. REV. 743 (2001) (stating that 
the FIPP framework is an alternative to privacy-as-control).   
188  Janet Dean Gertz, The Purloined Personality: Consumer Profiling in Financial 
Services Comment, 39 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 943, 980 (2002). 
189 Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Dep’t of Def., 543 F.3d 59, 85 (2d Cir. 2008); Dep't of 
the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 381 (1976). 
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Privacy Act of 1974, 190  Health Insurance Portability and Accountability 
Act,191  Fair Credit Reporting Act,192  Video Privacy Protection Act,193 and 
many state genetic privacy laws.194  Further, this is not only a feature of these 
specific statutes, but rather a core part of the underlying FIPP framework.  As 
Barocas and Nissenbaum explain, the framework provides two options:  
consent or anonymize.195  Thus, this approach only provides limited rights of 
control when the information is connected to the individual—when use would 
entail access.  It does not provide a right against mere unconsented use. 
Furthermore, as a normative matter, there are good reasons why 
privacy law should not include rights that protect against mere unconsented 
use.  To do so would be to reinforce the mistaken conflation of autonomy and 
privacy.  The conflation of these issues dates back at least as far as the 
Supreme Court cases describing constitutionally-protected rights to 
contraception and abortion as “privacy rights.” This categorization of these 
rights was widely criticized as creating conceptual confusion, 196  and the 
Supreme Court has recently remedied this error.  It now characterizes these 
reproductive rights (and other related rights) in terms of autonomy rather than 
privacy.197  Informational law should not re-introduce the confusion. 
To state that privacy and autonomy should not be conflated is not to 
deny that there is a connection between them.  For example, it is clear that 
autonomy interests provide one strong justification for granting privacy 
rights.  As discussed in Part I, autonomy is at the core of most accounts of 
why privacy rights are important.  But it is a mistake to then interpret these 
privacy rights as protecting a broader set of informational autonomy interests.  
This reasoning is similar to a common logical error, the “fallacy of the 
converse,” in which one starts with a true proposition and then invalidly infers 
its converse.  In this case (stated simply), “protecting autonomy requires 
protecting privacy” is mistakenly taken to imply “protecting privacy requires 
protecting autonomy.”  Likewise, the fact that autonomy justifies privacy 
rights does not mean that these privacy rights should take the form of a right 
to prevent unconsented use.  As Paul Schwartz explains: “Protection of the 
capacity for self-determination requires a setting of limits on the collection of 
                                               
190 See 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)(1)– (12) (2012). 
191 Lawrence O. Gostin & James G. Jr. Hodge, Personal Privacy and Common Goods, 86 
MINN. L. REV. 1439, 1459 (2002).  
192 Benjamin Charkow, The Control over the De-Identification of Data, 21 CARDOZO 
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 195, 208 (2003). 
193 In re Nickelodeon Consumer Privacy Litigation, 827 F.3d 262, 279 (Third Cir.  2016). 
194 See, e.g., Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 192.531–.549 (West 2007); N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 10:5-
43 to -49 (West 2013). 
195 Solon Barocas & Helen Nissenbaum, Big Data’s End Run around Procedural Privacy 
Protections, 57 COMM. ACM 31 (2014). 
196 See sources cited supra note 39.   
197 See generally Greene, supra note 38.   
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personal data, but it does not call for privacy-control as a central means of 
achieving these limits.”198   
In arguing that the unconsented use of personal information should 
not be restricted by privacy rights, I am not arguing that it should not be 
restricted on other grounds.  For example, while the Fair Information 
Practices Principles have often been classified as an aspect of privacy law, it 
seems to me that they are actually (as the name suggests) about fairness.  This 
is not, however, merely a linguistic point.  Classification here has normative 
significance: when the interests implicated by unconsented use are properly 
identified, we will likely find that they do not justify rights as expansive as 
privacy rights.   
C.  The Status of Inferences 
Having argued that the aggregation and unconsented use of personal 
information do not themselves violate privacy rights (independently of 
violating an access restriction), I will now turn to a final question that emerges 
from this analysis: the question of whether inferences violate privacy rights.   
It is clear that the analysis of disclosed personal data can reveal 
personal facts that were not knowingly disclosed.  Perhaps the most often-
cited example of this is the case of Target correctly inferring the early-stage 
pregnancy of customers based on their purchasing pattern of items that were 
not explicitly linked to pregnancy, such as unscented lotion.  This example 
will soon seem quaint, however, as machine learning algorithms are used to 
infer significantly more complex personal traits from seemingly-irrelevant 
data collected across disparate domains of life.   
It is often said that these types of discoveries violate privacy rights,199 
but this conclusion relies on the unexplored assumption that inferences can 
do so.  Perhaps the fact that inferences can clearly cause significant privacy 
losses—and in ways that are often not reasonably foreseeable—makes it seem 
equally clear that they can violate privacy rights.  As my analysis has 
highlighted, however, what privacy rights protect is not a reasonable 
expectation that privacy will be maintained; rather, they protect reasonable 
expectations that privacy will not be lost in certain ways.   
Thus, the core unexplored question is whether privacy rights 
currently restrict inferences, and whether they should.  This section will argue 
                                               
198 Schwartz, supra note 187, at 759. 
199 See, e.g., Crawford & Schultz, supra note 1, at 96–106; Benjamin Zhou, A Traditional 
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that inferences do not violate established privacy rights in the ways that have 
been widely stated, and furthermore, that the creation of privacy rights that 
could be violated by inferences would raise significant normative concerns 
that would (at the very least) justify restricting such rights in ways that have 
received insufficient attention.  
1.  The Fourth Amendment 
It is often stated that the Supreme Court’s decision in Kyllo v. United 
States held that the Fourth Amendment can be violated by the inference of 
information in which one has a reasonable expectation of privacy or by the 
acquisition of data that allows for such inferences.200   In fact, the Court 
reached the opposite conclusion in this landmark case, which appears to be 
the only case of privacy law that explicitly addresses the status of inferences 
in privacy violations.201  It seems that significant confusion has arisen from 
the Court’s conclusion that an inference cannot “insulate” a search—a 
conclusion that it reiterates, without much discussion, in its recent ruling in 
Carpenter v. United States.202  In order to understand what the Court means 
by this, and the status of inferences more generally, it is necessary to clarify 
some of the significant complexities of Kyllo.  Although the case is nominally 
about thermal-imaging, which might seem low-tech, the Court addresses 
complex epistemological issues that are directly relevant to the machine-
learning algorithms of today.   
                                               
200  See, e.g., Leslie A. Lunney, Has the Fourth Amendment Gone to the Dogs: 
Unreasonable Expansion of Canine Sniff Doctrine to Include Sniffs of the Home, 88 OR. L. 
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Amendment: Weighing Caballes under the Proposed “Vehicular Frisk” Standard, 43 VAL. U. 
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eliminate a reasonable expectation of privacy.  Compare Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 
657 (1980) (holding that the defendants had a reasonable expectation of privacy in 
pornographic films, even though their boxes had allowed by government to “draw inferences 
about what was on the films”) with Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 764–65 n. 13 (holding 
that some containers, such as gun cases, “by their very nature cannot support any reasonable 
expectation of privacy because their contents can be inferred from their outward appearance”). 
202 Carpenter v. United States, 139 S.Ct. 2206, 13 (2018). 
        LOSSES VERSUS VIOLATIONS 
  
51 
The core question in the case is whether the use of a thermal-imaging 
device to detect heat within a home violates a reasonable expectation of 
privacy protected by the Fourth Amendment.203  The Court holds that it does, 
but the case is decided in a 5 to 4 split,204 with the disagreement focusing on 
the role of inferences in the case and in the law.  This disagreement starts with 
a claim made by the dissent, which accuses the Court of ignoring “a 
distinction of constitutional magnitude between ‘through-the-wall 
surveillance’ that gives the observer or listener direct access to information 
in a private area” and “off-the-wall surveillance” that allows one “to draw 
inferences from information in the public domain.” 205   According to the 
dissent, the Court’s finding of a search establishes “for the first time in its 
history….that an inference can amount to a Fourth Amendment violation.”206  
In response, the majority accuses the dissent of adopting “the novel 
proposition that an inference insulates a search,” which it states is “blatantly 
contrary” to well-established precedent.207  From these statements, it might 
seem that the majority and dissent reach opposing conclusions about the legal 
status of inferences.  But in fact, they do not.  In order to understand their 
positions—and what the Court actually holds—it is necessary to unpack 
several issues.  
 To start, it is important to recognize that while the dissent seems to 
attach legal significance to the distinction between direct “through-the-wall” 
and indirect “off-the-wall” data gathering—which could be relevant to the 
operation of many algorithms (which are arguably “off the wall”)—it cannot 
be the case that the distinction has constitutional relevance in and of itself.  As 
the majority notes, this position would be incompatible with well-established 
precedent: for example, the impermissibility of using directional microphones 
to listen to conversations inside the house, even though they measure sound 
from “off the wall.”  In addition, it would be incompatible with the dissent’s 
position that a more sophisticated thermal-imaging device that reveals 
activities in the home would be impermissible, even though such a device 
would also only measure heat “off-the-wall” rather than “through-the-wall.”  
For these reasons, the direct/indirect distinction must be relevant only 
to the extent that it maps onto the access/inference distinction that the dissent 
also highlights.  This is a core issue that the government raised at oral 
                                               
203 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 29 (2001). 
204 The opinion of the Court was written by Justice Scalia and joined by Justices Souter, 
Thomas, Ginsburg, and Breyer.  The dissent was written by Justice Stevens and joined by Chief 
Justice Rehnquist and Justices O’Connor and Kennedy. 
205 Id. 
206 Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 44 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  See also id. at 49 (“[T]he Court 
effectively treats the mental process of analyzing data obtained from external sources as the 
equivalent of a physical intrusion into the home. As I have explained, however, the process of 
drawing inferences from data in the public domain should not be characterized as a search.”). 
207 Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 36. 
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argument, when the Deputy Solicitor General highlighted that police could 
not learn “directly from the imager” that heat was being generated inside the 
house.  Rather, he explained, the police had to infer this, as it was possible 
that the heat had been produced in some other way: for example, the walls 
could have been “unduly heated up by the sun.” 208  This reduced the 
“specificity and directness, the linearity of any inference” that could be drawn 
from the heat sensor. 209   Likewise, the dissent highlights that “the only 
conclusions the officers reached concerning the interior of the home were at 
least as indirect as those that might have been inferred from the contents of 
discarded garbage.” 210   This feature of the technology—the fact that 
inferences were required to gain knowledge of the inside of the home—
provides the best explanation of why the dissent concludes that the technology 
“did not obtain any information regarding the interior of the home.”211   
In drawing this conclusion, however, the dissent fails to recognize the 
difference between two different questions, which is worth highlighting 
because it will be relevant to many technologies.  The first is the question of 
whether one accesses a piece of information.  The second is the question of 
whether one knows that one has done so.  In this case, the police might not 
have known with certainty that the technology was revealing heat inside the 
house.  Because of the potentially confounding factors, any conclusion about 
the inside of the home was an uncertain inference.  But this does not mean 
that the technology was not in fact measuring heat from the interior of the 
home.  One is a question of what they knew; the other is a question of what 
they did. 
Unfortunately, this crucial distinction is not recognized by either side, 
which has resulted in significant confusion about key matters of law.  This 
starts with the majority thinking that the dissent was making the 
“extraordinary assertion that anything learned through ‘an inference’ cannot 
be a search,” to which it replied: “The novel proposition that inference 
insulates a search is blatantly contrary to United States v. Karo, where the 
police ‘inferred’ from the activation of a beeper that a certain can of ether was 
in the home. The police activity was held to be a search, and the search was 
held unlawful.”212  But as the dissent clarifies, this is not what it was saying: 
                                               
208 Kyllo v. U.S., 2001 WL 168056, 41-42 (U.S. Oral. Arg., 2001). 
209 Id.; see also id. (“There isn't a one-to-one correspondence between heat on the exterior 
of the structure and heat on the interior of the structure.”). 
210 Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 44 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
211 While the dissent does not spell this out explicitly, this seems to be the best explanation 
of this conclusion.  This feature also underlies the dissent’s comparison of the technology with 
other practices that were permissible under well-established precedent: “the only conclusions 
the officers reached concerning the interior of the home were at least as indirect as those that 
might have been inferred from the contents of discarded garbage…  or pen register data… or, 
as in this case, subpoenaed utility records.” Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 44 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
212 Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 36–37. 
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Although the Court credits us with the ‘novel proposition that 
inference insulates a search,’ our point simply is that an 
inference cannot be a search, contrary to the Court’s 
reasoning. Thus, the Court’s use of United States v. Karo to 
refute a point we do not make underscores the fact that the 
Court has no real answer (either in logic or in law) to the point 
we do make.  Karo itself does not provide any support for the 
Court’s view that inferences can amount to unconstitutional 
searches. 213   
In order to unpack the disagreement here, it is necessary to first clarify a point 
about Karo.  While the police in this case did infer that the ether can was in 
the house, as the majority’s comment highlights, Karo did not hold that this 
inference constituted the search.  Rather, it held that the “monitoring of a 
beeper in a private residence” (i.e., the acquisition of raw data underlying the 
inference) violated the Fourth Amendment.214  Thus, the Kyllo majority’s 
discussion of inferences in Karo was not meant to establish that an inference 
can constitute a search, but rather that the acquisition of the raw data can 
constitute a search even if inferences are required to interpret it.  
Unfortunately, the majority’s description of the holding in Karo did 
not only cause confusion in the dissent, but also in the literature on the legal 
status of inferences.  It has led many to conclude that an inference can 
constitute a search and turn the underlying collection of data into a search.  
For example, Leslie Lunney concludes that the thermal scan in Kyllo was a 
search “because it made technology-assisted inferencing about the interior of 
a home possible,”215 and this interpretation of the majority’s statement is 
widespread.216  However, as should now be clear, this is not what the majority 
meant.  The majority further clarifies this point in a footnote about its 
“insulate a search” comment:  
The dissent asserts that we have misunderstood its point, 
which is not that inference insulates a search, but that 
inference alone is not a search. If we misunderstood the 
point, it was only in a good-faith effort to render the point 
germane to the case at hand. The issue in this case is not the 
police’s allegedly unlawful inferencing, but their allegedly 
unlawful thermal-imaging measurement of the emanations 
from a house. We say such measurement is a search; the 
dissent says it is not, because an inference is not a search. We 
took that to mean that, since the technologically enhanced 
emanations had to be the basis of inferences before anything 
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214 United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 714 (1984).  
215 Lunney, supra note 200, at 855. 
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inside the house could be known, the use of the emanations 
could not be a search. But the dissent certainly knows better 
than we what it intends. And if it means only that an inference 
is not a search, we certainly agree.217 
Here, the Court’s reference to what is “known” about the inside of the house 
points to the actual nature of the disagreement between the majority and 
dissent, which I touched on earlier.  It is a disagreement about the level of 
epistemic warrant that is needed to cause a privacy violation.  Whereas the 
dissent asks if the technology provides the police with knowledge about the 
inside of the house, the majority asks if it provides them with data about the 
inside the house.  
Further, because they start with different questions without 
recognizing it, the majority misinterprets the minority’s legal position and 
vice versa. First, the majority: because the majority focuses on data 
acquisition and concludes that the technology does provide data about the 
inside the house (as a factual matter), it believes that dissent’s denial of a 
search relies on the assumption that an inference can insulate a search (as a 
matter of law).  This is the only way the majority is able to understand how 
the dissent reaches the conclusion that there is no search.  Second, the dissent: 
because the dissent focuses on knowledge and concludes that the technology 
does not provide knowledge of the inside of the home (as a factual matter), it 
believes that the majority’s finding of a search relies on the assumption that 
an inference can constitute a search (as a matter of law).  This is the only way 
the dissent is able to understand how the dissent reaches the conclusion that 
there is search. 
Thus, while it might appear that the majority and dissent reach 
different legal conclusions in the case because they disagree about matters of 
fact, it is actually because they disagree on a matter of law.  They disagree 
about the epistemic status that is required for a search, and therefore ask 
different questions about the facts.  While a complete analysis of this issue is 
outside the scope of this paper, I will make one brief observation, as it 
parallels my earlier argument about the “epistemic merit” criterion for privacy 
losses (Part III.B): although a means of access does not need to provide 
knowledge to violate the Fourth Amendment, as the Kyllo dissent assumes, it 
seems that the dissent was right to think that there is an epistemic requirement.  
Under Karo, at least, it seems that a means of access can only violate a 
reasonable expectation of privacy if it provides one with grounds for forming 
a true belief about the data at issue—that the mere fact that data is acquired 
by a technology is insufficient.218   
                                               
217 Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 37 n.4. 
218 This epistemic requirement is implicit in the Court’s decision in Karo, where the police 
not only tracked the can of ether when it was inside a home (as discussed above), but also when 
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In sum, despite their disagreements and contrary to a widespread 
reading of the case, both the majority and dissent in Kyllo agree that an 
inference cannot violate a reasonable expectation of privacy.  Further, neither 
opinion supports the claim that an inference of personal information from data 
can transform the underlying collection of that data into Fourth Amendment 
violation. 
2.  Beyond the Fourth Amendment 
It is unclear whether other sources of privacy law, including the 
various sources that have adopted a version of the “reasonable expectation of 
privacy” test,219 will reach the same conclusion as the Supreme Court in Kyllo.  
But it is clear from the privacy literature that many would argue that this 
approach is mistaken and that inferences can violate privacy rights.  There is 
insufficient space to properly address this issue here.  I will merely identify 
three reasons to think that a privacy right against inferences would, at the very 
least, need to be more limited than has been recognized.   
First and most importantly, a privacy right that restricted one’s ability 
to infer private facts about others would impose restrictions on purely mental 
activity.  This would violate foundational principles of ethics and law.220  
Even indirect means of mind control have been found unconstitutional.221  
Thus, if privacy law were to recognize a right to prevent inferences, the scope 
of the right would clearly need to be limited to exclude mental inferences.  
Some distinction between human and non-human inferences would need to 
be drawn and justified. 
Second, even if the right only restricted computer-assisted inferential 
analysis, it would impose limits on free inquiry, independently of any material 
harm.  There are strong normative grounds, and potentially constitutional 
                                               
a search (as discussed above and in Kyllo), it held that the tracking in the warehouse was not.  
The reason was that “the beeper informed the agents only that the ether was somewhere in the 
warehouse; it did not identify the specific locker in which the ether was located.”  Karo, 468 
U.S. at 720. The locker “was identified only when agents traversing the public parts of the 
facility found that the smell of ether was coming from a specific locker.”  Id. The monitoring 
of “the beeper revealed nothing about the contents of the locker… and hence was not a search 
of that locker.”  Id. at 720-721.  Thus, although the beeper was in fact transmitting its location 
from inside the locker, it provided the police with no way to form a belief about its location 
inside the locker, and for this reason was insufficient to constitute a search.   
219 These include the common law privacy torts, the Freedom of Information Act, the 
Privacy Act of 1974, the constitutional right of information privacy, and various evidentiary 
privileges.  Lior J. Strahilevitz, A Social Networks Theory of Privacy, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 919, 
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grounds, to be concerned about such liberty restrictions.222  To determine 
whether these interests are outweighed by the privacy interests, it is necessary 
to differentiate between two different types of inquiry: data gathering versus 
data analysis.  Restrictions on the freedom to engage in data gathering might 
be well-justified by privacy interests, but many of these justifications (for 
example, those based in a conception of private spaces) do not apply to 
restrictions on data analysis. 223  Thus, there may be a stronger basis for 
limiting a right to prevent inferences—just as the First Amendment imposes 
significant limits on the right to prevent disclosure.  
Third, the affirmative basis for recognizing a right to prevent 
inferences is limited in ways that have been obscured by the failure to 
differentiate between the different types of interests at stake.  Imagine, for 
example, that a company’s HR department uses a sophisticated algorithm to 
predict health problems from non-health data in job applications.  While the 
applicants in this case certainly have an interest in preventing the inferences, 
this is only partly an interest in preventing access to their health information 
(i.e., a matter of privacy).  It is also—and arguably more so—an interest in 
preventing the use of this information in making a hiring decision (i.e., a 
matter of fairness).  But to protect the latter type of interests, the law should 
grant rights that target this harmful conduct (e.g., a right against health-based 
discrimination), not a right to prevent the inferences.  Of course, there may be 
cases in which it is difficult to prevent the harmful conduct, in which case 
preventing the inferences might be a justifiable second-best solution.  But in 
this case, the right against the inferences would not be properly classified as 
a privacy right. 
CONCLUSION 
It is widely thought that the core problems posed by new technologies 
of personal data mining and analysis, as well as their solutions, can be 
explained in terms of privacy.  There is also growing agreement that a unified 
theory privacy is unattainable.  Both of these conclusions are misguided and 
derive from a failure to differentiate between the descriptive and normative 
dimensions of privacy—between privacy losses and privacy violations.  The 
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difference is that a privacy loss occurs when a person or fact about a person 
is accessed epistemically, whereas a privacy violation occurs when a 
restriction on the permissible means of generating such access is breached.  
This theory of privacy fits and justifies our best judgements about when 
privacy is lost and violated, and it unifies privacy along its descriptive 
dimension, allowing for normative disagreement on questions such as which 
means of access are impermissible.   At the same time, however, it has a 
critical edge that reveals that data aggregation, the unconsented use of 
personal data, and the inference of private facts do not violate privacy rights—
at least not in ways that have been widely stated.  It is possible that these 
practices should be restricted on other grounds.  But when the actual interests 
at stake are identified, it will become clear that they do not always justify 
restrictions that are as expansive as those imposed by privacy rights.  For all 
who are concerned about the ever-expanding uses of our personal data, this 
may appear to be a cost of the theory.  If so, it should be accepted as the cost 
of coherence.  Recognizing the difference between losses and violations 
reveals the unity and limits of privacy. 
